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I. INTRODUCTION
Think of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act and you might conjure up visions of fresh-faced
prosecutors bringing down organized-crime kingpins.
Think again. Thanks to the Gang That Can't Shoot
Straight-Congress-the 1970 RICO statute has instead be-
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come the scourge of corporate directors, accountants and
others whose only link to a racket is the tennis court.'
With the inclusion of mail,2 wire,3 and securities fraud4 as
predicate offenses, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganizations Act 5 (RICO) has developed into a most devastating
weapon in the hands of attorneys who handle plaintiffs' busi-
ness fraud litigation. RICO's treble damage and attorney's fee
provision 6 mandates that garden variety fraud cases be ana-
lyzed for inclusion of RICO counts. It is the purpose of this
article to suggest a meaningful interpretation of RICO's pat-
tern requirement that will limit RICO's application to the ha-
bitual offender, the intended target of the legislation.
Because, by its terms, RICO must be construed liberally to
effectuate its remedial purpose,7 the breadth of RICO has
spread in recent years.8 In 1988 alone, RICO has been ex-
1. Wall St.J., Aug. 23, 1988, at 21, col. 1.
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1984).
3. Id. § 1343.
4. Id. § 1961(l)(D). This section provides that "racketeering activity" includes
any offense involving fraud in the sale of securities.
5. Id. §§ 1961-68.
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) provides that:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of
section 1962 of this chapter [18 U.S.C. § 1982] may sue therefor in any ap-
propriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the dam-
age he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's
fee.
7. The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84
Stat. 947, states that "[t]he provisions of... [RICO] shall be liberally construed to
effectuate its remedial purposes." See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473
U.S. 479 (1985).
RICO is to be read broadly. This is the lesson not only of Congress' self-
consciously expansive language and overall approach ... but also of its ex-
press admonition that RICO is to "be liberally construed to effectuate its
remedial purposes." The statute's "remedial purposes" are nowhere more
evident than in the provision of a private action for those injured by racke-
teering activity.
Id. at 497-98 (citations omitted). See also Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd on other grounds, 473 U.S.
606 (1985). "[Tlhe fact that RICO has been applied in situations not expressly antic-
ipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth." 747
F.2d at 398.
An analysis of cases with respect to this issue can be found in Blakey, The RICO
Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennet v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237,
245 (1982).
8. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE AD Hoc CIVIL RICO TASK
FORCE, Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law (1985) [hereinafter ABA
TASK FORCE REPORT]. This report references a computerized data base of RICO de-
cisions relating to approximately 300 federal civil RICO cases from the statute's in-
[Vol. 15
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tended to apply to a wide variety of cases including wrongful
discharge litigation.9 Eastern Airlines and its parent company,
Texas Air, have filed a $1.5 billion lawsuit under RICO against
the Airline Pilot's Association and the International Associa-
tion of Machinists charging the Unions with an illegal smear
campaign intended to ruin Eastern's business reputation.' 0
The Department of Justice has obtained an indictment against
a Rhode Island businessman under RICO for alleged viola-
tions of federal laws relating to the handling of hazardous
wastes." Laventhol & Horwath, the ninth largest public ac-
counting firm in the United States, recently paid $15 million in
an out of court settlement of a RICO class action suit involving
alleged fraud by Laventhol & Horwath in the auditing of cer-
tain tax shelter limited partnerships.' 2
The judiciary has not been unaware of the explosion in
RICO litigation. In its 1985 decision, Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
Co., Inc. ,'3 the United States Supreme Court recognized that
"in its private civil version, RICO is evolving into something
quite different from the original concept of its enactors."' 4
The Court suggested that this divergence appeared to be "pri-
marily the result of the breadth of the predicate offenses, in
particular the inclusion of wire, mail, and securities fraud, and
the failure of Congress and the courts to develop a meaningful concept of
'pattern. ' '15
At footnote fourteen of that opinion, the Court attempted to
provide some guidance as to how the pattern element might be
interpreted.' 6 The Court commented that while only two acts
ception through 1984. Of the approximately 270 trial court decisions in the
database, three percent were decided before 1980, two percent in 1980, seven per-
cent in 1981, 13 percent in 1983, and 43 percent in 1984. Id. at 55. According to the
database, 40 percent of the cases involved allegations of securities fraud and another
37 percent alleged common law fraud in a commercial or business setting. Approxi-
mately nine percent of the cases involved arson, bribery, embezzlement, extortion,
gambling, theft, or political corruption. Id. at 55-56.
9. See McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Ky. 1988).
10. See 3 Civil RICO Rep. (BNA) at 1, May 10, 1988.
11. Id. at 2.
12. Id. at 4.
13. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
14. Id. at 500.
15. Id. (emphasis added).
16. Id. at 496. Footnote fourteen reads as follows:
As many commentators have pointed out, the definition of a "pattern of
racketeering activity" differs from the other provisions in § 1961 in that it
states that a pattern "requires at least two acts of racketeering activity," ... not that
1989]
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of racketeering activity are necessary under the statute for a
pattern to exist, two acts "may not be sufficient"' 17 to actually
constitute a pattern. The Court also noted that the congres-
sional history suggests that the elements of continuity and rela-
tionship as well as the threat of ongoing activity are the focus
of the pattern element. 18 Finally, the Court referenced a sec-
tion of the same omnibus legislation dealing with sentencing
guidelines for repeat offenders as a possible source for inter-
preting the pattern element. 19
Since Sedima, the pattern requirement has been in a total
state of flux. 20 Virtually every circuit has been heard on the
subject. Interpretations of what constitutes a pattern range
from the "multiple schemes" approach of the Eighth Circuit, 2'
to the Fifth Circuit's liberal interpretation, which requires only
two related predicate acts. 22 Definitions of pattern vary not
it "means" two such acts. The implication is that while two acts are neces-
sary, they may not be sufficient. Indeed, in common parlance two of any-
thing do not generally form a "pattern." The legislative history supports
the view that two isolated acts of racketeering activity do not constitute a
pattern. As the Senate Report explained: "The target of [RICO] is thus not
sporadic activity. The infiltration of legitimate business normally requires
more than one 'racketeering activity' and the threat of continuing activity to
be effective. It is this factor of continuity plus relationship which combines to
produce a pattern." Similarly, the sponsor of the Senate bill, after quoting
this portion of the Report, pointed out to his colleagues that "[t]he term
'pattern' itself requires the showing of a relationship. . . . So, therefore,
proof of two acts of racketeering activity, without more, does not establish a
pattern .. " Significantly, in defining "pattern" in a later provision of the
same bill, Congress was more enlightening: "[Ciriminal conduct forms a
pattern if it embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes,
results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are
interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events."
This language may be useful in interpreting other sections of the Act.




20. See Blakey, RICO Litigation Update, RICO: LITIGATION UPDATE 129 (A. Ma-
thews, ed. 1988) [hereinafter RICO UPDATE].
Unfortunately, the district courts since Sedima have largely remained "un-
reconstructed."... Ignoring the general teachings of Sedima, and narrowly
focusing on footnote 14, they have continued to dismiss most civil RICO
cases, not seeking, as the Supreme Court suggested, to develop a "meaning-
ful" definition of the concept of pattern, but to find an easy device to clear
their dockets.
Id. at 199 (citations omitted).
21. See, e.g., Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1986) (one iso-
lated fraudulent scheme insufficient to state RICO claim).
22. See, e.g., R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350 (5th Cir. 1985). But
cf Montesano v. Seafirst Commercial Corp., 818 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1987) (following
R.A.G.S. but urging that liberal interpretation be overruled because acts in prepara-
[Vol. 15
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only from circuit to circuit but also within certain circuits. 23
It now appears that the Supreme Court is prepared to con-
front the issue of what constitutes a "pattern of racketeering
activity." In granting review of H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tele-
phone Co. ,24 the Court has agreed to review, inter alia, whether
the petitioners properly alleged a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity. Northwestern Bell involves allegations of bribery of public
officials to influence utility rate-making decisions. The Eighth
Circuit previously affirmed the dismissal of the RICO claims on
pattern grounds, finding that the plaintiff had failed to allege
multiple schemes.
The purpose of this article is to suggest a meaningful inter-
pretation of RICO's pattern requirement. It is the Authors'
contention that RICO was intended to reach the habitual of-
fender, the offender who portrays by his or her conduct a pro-
tion for a single offense should not be a pattern). See also Beck v. Manufacturers'
Hanover Trust, Co., 820 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1987).
23. Compare Furman v. Cirrito, 828 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1987) with Reiter's Beer
Dist., Inc. v. Christian Schmidt Brewing Co., 657 F. Supp. 136 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). In
Furman, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a claim based on the failure of
some partners to disclose to other partners information about the sale of the partner-
ship. The court dismissed on the theory that because the claim was based on a part-
nership dissolution, the element of continuity was missing from the enterprise
element. In Reiter's, however, the district court found a pattern in a three year course
of conduct based on a claim to force the plaintiff out of business. In both cases, the
claims involved conduct relating to the potential termination of an entity. This sort
of conduct was sufficient in Furman, to warrant dismissal under an enterprise theory,
but in Reiter's such conduct does not seem to have played a role.
The Eighth Circuit's multiple scheme analysis has been questioned at least three
times by panels within that circuit. See infra note 115 and accompanying text. There
are many other examples of disagreements between circuits, and even within circuits,
as to the appropriate test for pattern. Compare Medical Emergency Serv. Ass'n, S.C.
v. Foulke, 844 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1988) with Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d
1297 (7th Cir. 1987). In Medical Emergency, the Seventh Circuit refused to find a pat-
tern in a case in which a group of doctors, through various schemes of alleged fraud,
caused the termination of a contract to provide medical services. The court found
that the various fraudulent transactions only amounted to one criminal episode,
rather than the "separate and distinct episodes of fraud" necessary to constitute a
pattern. Id. at 397. However, in Liquid Air a panel in that same circuit upheld the
finding of a pattern in a case which involved defrauding the plaintiff through a single
scheme, implemented by the mailing of several fraudulent invoices over a seven
month period. 834 F.2d at 1304-05. In Medical Emergency, the Seventh Circuit panel
denied pattern because the cumulative effect of all the fraudulent acts had only one
ultimate objective. The defendants in Liquid Air also had only objective-theft from
the plaintiff through fraud-yet that particular panel found such conduct to be suffi-
cient, distinguishing Liquid Air from Medical Emergency on the basis that each fraudu-
lent invoice caused a distinct injury.
24. 829 F.2d 648 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1219 (1988).
19891
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pensity to adopt a criminal approach in order to conduct his or
her business affairs. We believe RICO was intended to reach
this habitual offender regardless of whether that offender is the
stereotyped "racketeer" or wears the cloak of a "legitimate"
business entity.2 5 Congress has defined the predicate acts
which constitute violations of RICO. Individuals and entities
who habitually elect to violate these predicate acts in the con-
duct of their businesses are indeed the targets of this legisla-
tion, and thus should be considered racketeers under the
statute.
Conversely, those individuals and entities who do not com-
mit predicate acts as a way of doing business, but rather com-
mit predicate acts only on a sporadic, isolated basis, should not
be subjected to RICO liability. The Authors believe that the
current statute provides a sufficient basis from which an appro-
priate pattern requirement can be formed.
This article will first place the pattern requirement of RICO
into context with other provisions of the statute. The evolu-
tion of the pattern requirement will then be discussed. Next, a
25. The United States Supreme Court specifically made this point in Sedima:
Underlying the Court of Appeals' holding was its distress at the "extraordi-
nary, if not outrageous," uses to which civil RICO has been put. Instead of
being used against mobsters and organized criminals, it has become a tool
for everyday fraud cases brought against "respected and legitimate 'enter-
prises'." Ibid. Yet Congress wanted to reach both "legitimate" and "illegiti-
mate" enterprises. The former enjoy neither an inherent incapacity for
criminal activity nor immunity from its consequences. The fact that
§ 1964(c) is used against respected businesses allegedly engaged in a pat-
tern of specifically identified criminal conduct is hardly a sufficient reason
for assuming that the provision is being misconstrued. Nor does it reveal
the "ambiguity" discovered by the court below. "[T]he fact that RICO has
been applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not
demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth."
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985) (citations omitted). See
also ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 71-2. The Task Force notes that the
concept of pattern was enacted because of the constitutional difficulties of simply
outlawing membership in typical organized crime groups such as the Mafia or La
Cosa Nostra. This would be accomplished by spelling out as predicate acts those
offenses "deemed to be the type of criminal activities frequently engaged in by mob-
sters, racketeers and other traditional members of 'organized crime.' " Id. at 72.
Accordingly, the pattern concept was devised so that a defendant's repeated use
of racketeering acts would serve to identify him or her as falling within the group of
persons targeted by RICO. "[T]he wearing of a white collar, even though it is
starched, does not preclude the organized pursuit of unlawful profit." United States
v. Carter, 493 F.2d 704, 708 (2d Cir. 1974). Thus, in the case of the hypothetical
securities fraud defendant, the appropriate analysis is a review of that defendant's
propensity to utilize acts of racketeering conduct on an ongoing, repeated basis as a
way of doing business.
[Vol. 15
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brief overview of pattern tests used by the various circuits will
be given. The multiple scheme approach of the Eighth Circuit
will be analyzed first, followed by a discussion of the liberal
treatment of pattern applied by the Fifth and Eleventh Cir-
cuits. We will then analyze the criminal episode approach,
which we suggest best implements the congressional intent be-
hind RICO.
Following our overview of the current pattern tests, we will
provide an in-depth discussion of the congressional history
and intent as it pertains to the pattern requirement. 26 The arti-
cle will conclude with a proposal for an appropriate pattern
standard.
II. RICO's PATrERN ELEMENT
In order to meaningfully discuss an appropriate pattern
standard, it is first necessary to understand the relevance of
pattern as an element of a RICO prima facie case. 27 Pursuant
to section 1962 of the statute, there are four categories of pro-
hibited activities. 28 First, section 1962(a) prohibits any person
who has received income from a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity or through collection of an unlawful debt from using or in-
vesting that income to acquire or operate an interest in any
enterprise engaged in or affecting interstate commerce.2 9
26. The Supreme Court in Sedima made reference to Senate Report No. 91-617,
a statement by Senator McClellan, which appeared in the Congressional Record, and
a statement by Representative Poff. 473 U.S. at 496 n. 14. Unfortunately, rather than
serving as food for thought and a catalyst for further analysis, this footnote reference
to such a small portion of the readily available history has become the almost exclu-
sive focal point ofjudicial interpretation of pattern since Sedima. See, e.g., Barticheck
v. Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat'l State, 832 F.2d 36, 38-40 (3d Cir. 1987); Sun Say.
and Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 191-94 (9th Cir. 1987); Roeder v. Alpha
Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 30-31 (Ist Cir. 1987); Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804
F.2d 970, 973-77 (7th Cir. 1986); Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252, 254-57
(8th Cir. 1986).
27. See RICO UPDATE, supra note 20, at 200. "A meaningful definition of 'pat-
tern' must begin with the language of the Statute." Id.
28. 18 U.S.C. § 1962.
29. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived,
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through col-
lection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a princi-
pal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or
invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of
such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or opera-
tion of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce.
1989]
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"Racketeering activity" is defined to include any act or threat
involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, brib-
ery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs,
or other specified acts, such as any acts indictable under stat-
utes relating to mail, wire or securities fraud. 30 "Person" is
defined in Section 1961(3) to include "any individual or entity
capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property."
Second, section 1962(b) provides that it
[S]hall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of
racketeering activity or through a collection of an unlawful
debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any inter-
est in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or
the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
30. The definitions pertinent to section 1962 are as follows:
(1) "racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder,
kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in ob-
scene matter, or dealing in narcotics or other dangerous drugs, which is
chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than
one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the following provi-
sions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), sec-
tion 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to
counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if
the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to
embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-94 (relating
to extortionate credit transactions), section 1084 (relating to the transmis-
sion of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section
1343 (relating to wire fraud), sections 1461-65 (relating to obscene matter),
section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to
obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruc-
tion of state or local law enforcement), section 1512 (relating to tampering
with a witness, victim, or an informant), section 1513 (relating to retaliating
against a witness, victim, or informant), section 1951 (relating to interfer-
ence with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to racke-
teering), section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering
paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments),
section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), sec-
tion 1956 (relating to the laundering of monetary instruments), section
1957 (relating to engaging in monetary transactions in property derived
from specified unlawful activity), sections 2312 and 2313 (relating to inter-
state transportation of motor vehicles), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to
interstate transportation of stolen property), section 2320 (relating to traf-
ficking in certain motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts), sections 2341-2346
(relating to trafficking in contraband cigarettes), sections 2421-24 (relating
to white slave traffic), (C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United
States Code, section 186 [29 U.S.C.S. § 186] (dealing with restrictions on
payments and loans to labor organizations) or section 501(c) [29 U.S.C.S.
§ 591(c)] (relating to embezzlement from union funds), (D) any offense in-
volving fraud connected with a cure under Title 1i, fraud in the sale of se-
curities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment,
buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs,
punishable under any law of the United States, (E) any act which is indicta-
ble under the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act.
18 U.S.C. § 1961 (Supp. 1988).
[Vol. 15
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Third, section 1962(c) provides that it
[S]hall be unlawful for any person employed by or associ-
ated with any enterprise engaged in, or, the activities of
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such en-
terprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity
or collection of unlawful debt.
3 2
Finally, section 1962(d) provides that it "shall be unlawful for
any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of sub-
sections (a), (b), or (c) of this section."
33
In summary it is a violation of RICO for a person: (1) To use
income received from a pattern of racketeering activity to ac-
quire or operate an enterprise; (2) to acquire or maintain an
interest in an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity; (3) to conduct or participate in the affairs of an enter-
prise through a pattern of racketeering activity; or (4) to
conspire to engage in such prohibited conduct. A pattern of
racketeering activity is thus the conduct which triggers viola-
tion of this statute. 3
4
A pattern is established, according to section 1961(5), by "at
least two acts of racketeering activity ... the last of which oc-
curred within ten years (excluding any period of imprison-
ment) after the commission of the prior act of racketeering
activity." 35 Other than the congressional history and some
analogies with similar statutes, the federal courts have been
free to create their own definitions. This lack of a detailed,
uniform definition has created difficulty, particularly since
Sedima, for courts attempting to interpret the pattern
requirement.3 6
31. Id. § 1962(b).
32. Id. § 1962(c).
33. Id. § 1962(d).
34. Footnote 14 of Sedima has encouraged courts and defendants anxious to dis-
miss RICO claims to focus on the pattern element. See Denenberg and Ramsay,
RICO's Pattern Requirement After Sedima: The Second Episode, 54 DEF. COUNS. J., 361
(1987). "Consequently, the pattern requirement is now being viewed as the key to
limiting the broad scope of civil-RICO actions." Id. at 363. See also Blakey, supra note
7, at 300-07. "Patterns of racketeering activity" may also be grouped into four
broad, but not mutually exclusive categories: (1) violence; (2) provision of illegal
goods and services; (3) corruption in the labor movement or among public officials;
and (4) commercial and other forms of fraud. Id.
35. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).
36. The difficulty certainly arises in part, but only in part, from judicial attempts
19891
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III. PRE-SEDIMA DECISIONS
Prior to Sedima the element of pattern was infrequently ad-
dressed in the civil case law. 3 7 Generally, the presence of a
pattern was assumed when at least two acts of racketeering ac-
tivity were asserted in the complaint.38 However, pattern was
addressed in a criminal context. These cases focused on two
terms which do not appear in the statute but are derived from
congressional history: "relationship ' and "continuity." 3 9
to use the pattern element as a vehicle for the dismissal of RICO claims from the
docket. Sedima can certainly be read as an invitation for courts to focus on the pattern
element as a way to limiting the application of RICO in civil fraud cases. See, e.g.,
Smoky Greenhaw Cotton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith, 785 F.2d 1274,
1280-81 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3211 (1987); Graham v. Slaughter,
624 F. Supp. 222, 224 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (federal courts should not accept "run-of-the-
mill business fraud cases" under RICO). However, such attempts to limit the appli-
cation of the statute must be consistent with the language of the statute, including the
definition of pattern set forth by Congress in § 1961(5), as well as the congressional
intent.
Gratuitous language in some judicial opinions is not conducive to such an effort.
See, e.g., Furman v. Cirrito, 828 F.2d 898, 903 (2d Cir. 1987) ("a paradigmatic exam-
ple of the unfairness that results when RICO, a statute intended to be an [assault on
organized crime] . . .is used in an attempt to make a 'federal' case of a simple falling
out between partners."); Condict v. Condict, 815 F.2d 579, 585 (10th Cir. 1987)
("this is but an unsuccessful effort to dress a garden-variety fraud and deceit case in
RICO clothing"); In re Dow Co. Sarabond Prod. Liab. Litig., 666 F. Supp. 1466,
1470 (D. Colo. 1987) ("RICO is a recurring nightmare for judicial courts across the
country. Like the Flying Dutchman, the statute refuses to be put to rest."); Master-
craft Indus., Inc. v Breining, 664 F. Supp. 859, 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("the facts of this
case provide graphic support for the frequently made assertions by the [RICO's] de-
tractors that the statute is being woefully abused by the civil bar."). See generally
RICO UPDATE, supra note 20, at 16-58 for a thorough jurisdiction by jurisdiction
review of recent pattern decisions.
For a contrary view, see United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981). "[W]e
are unpersuaded that Congress nevertheless confined the reach of the law to only the
narrow aspects of organized crime." Id. See also Sedima, 473 U.S. at 479. "[Legitimate
business] enjoy[s] neither an inherent incapacity for criminal activity nor immunity
from its consequences." Id. at 499.
37. See ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 195.
38. See, e.g., Sutcliff, Inc. v. Donovan Co., Inc., 727 F.2d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 1984).
See generally ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 195 n.309.
39. See, e.g., Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus., Inc., 770 F.2d 717 (8th Cir.
1985) (acts of racketeering activity should be related by some common scheme or
plan); United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir. 1980) (no need for relation-
ship other than a connection to the enterprise); United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp.
609, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819
(1976) (adopting Dept. of Justice position: Acts should be "connected with each
other by some common scheme, plan or motive"). For examples of different ways of
dealing with the "continuity" prong, see Stofisky, 409 F. Supp at 614 (major concern
of Congress was special danger of continuing criminal conduct). See also United
States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd 578 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.
[Vol. 15
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The term "relationship" was used by Senator McClellan, a
sponsor of the original bill, when he wrote that a pattern re-
quires the "showing of a relationship.- 40 This term, and the
term "continuity" also appear in the report of the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee in a discussion of "pattern":
The concept of "pattern" is essential to the operation of the
statute. One isolated "racketeering activity" was thought
insufficient to trigger the remedies provided . . . largely be-
cause the net would be too large and the remedies dispro-
portionate to the gravity of the offense. The target of title
IX is thus not sporadic activity. The infiltration of legiti-
mate business normally requires more than one "racketeer-
ing activity" to be effective. It is this factor of continuity
plus relationship which combines to produce a pattern. 4 1
Some cases have interpreted the term "relationship" to mean
that the racketeering acts themselves must be related or con-
nected to each other by "some common scheme, plan or mo-
tive" 42 as opposed to simply being a series of disconnected
acts. 43 For example, in United States v. Starnes,44 the Seventh
Circuit held that a pattern of racketeering activity existed when
two or more acts were "connected to each other in some logi-
cal manner so as to effect an unlawful end." 45 Similarly, in
United States v. Brooklier,46 the Ninth Circuit stated that "a pat-
tern may be established by showing two or more acts . . . as
long as the defendant committed two of the acts and both of
them were connected by a common scheme, plan or motive." 47
1978) (pattern contemplates prolonged course of conduct); United States v. White,
386 F. Supp. 882, 883 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (pattern requires combination of acts form-
ing a "consistent or characteristic arrangement"). See also REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
ON THEJUDICIARY, UNITED STATES SENATE, No. 167, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 158 (1969)
[hereinafter SENATE REP.]. But cf. United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595,
601-602 (7th Cir. 1978) (five separate acts of mail fraud enough); United States v.
Chovanec, 467 F. Supp. 41, 44 (S.D. N.Y. 1979) (six acts of wire fraud in one scheme
enough).
40. McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S.30) Or Its Critics: Which Threatens Civil
Liberties?, 46 NOTRE DAME L. REV., 55, 144 (1970).
41. See SENATE REP., supra note 39, at 158.
42. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. at 614.
43. Id.
44. 644 F.2d 673 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 826 (1981).
45. 644 F.2d at 678.
46. 685 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983).
47. 685 F.2d at 1222. According to the ABA Task Force Report, these cases
reached this result in part due to the pattern requirement found under Title X of the
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Other courts have held that the concept of relationship did
not require a relationship between predicate acts but, rather,
required only that any two racketeering acts were committed in
the conduct of an enterprise. 48 For example, in United States v.
DePalma,49 the District Court for the Southern District of New
York found that since the statutory definition of pattern con-
tained no reference to a requirement of relatedness, none
should be required beyond a relationship of the racketeering
acts to the enterprise. 50 In United States v. Elliot,51 the defend-
ants participated in a series of unrelated criminal acts which
included arson, murder, theft and extortion. The Fifth Circuit
held that this was indeed the type of conduct targeted by Con-
gress when it enacted RICO. 52
same statute. ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 196-97. Title X provides
that "criminal conduct forms a pattern if it embraces criminal acts that have the same
or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or
otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated
events." 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e). In Stofsky the court specifically referred to the fact that
this section of the statute, which is a definition used for sentencing guidelines for
repeat offenders, should be construed consistently with Title IX (RICO) because stat-
utes enacted simultaneously and employing the same terms should be so construed.
409 F. Supp. at 613-14. Accord McClellan, supra note 40, at 154. But cf. United States
v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980): "[T]he fact that
the two sections were enacted simultaneously yet embody different definitions of
'pattern' would seem to indicate that Congress intentionally chose to use the term
differently in different contexts." 624 F.2d at 1123.
48. See, e.g., Weisman, 624 F.2d at 1122. "[T]he statutory language does not ex-
pressly require that the predicate acts of racketeering be specifically 'related' to each
other and we find no affirmative evidence in the legislative history from which we
should infer such a requirement. Id. But see McClellan, supra note 40, contra.
49. 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
50. Id. at 782. See also United States v. Welch, 656 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied 456 U.S. 915 (1982) (commission of two predicate crimes sufficient to show
participation in affairs of enterprise).
51. 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
52. 571 F.2d at 902-03. See also Note, Reconsideration of Pattern in Civil RICO Of-
fenses, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 83, 87-88 (1986). But cf ABA TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 8, at 199-201:
The approach taken in these other decisions [rejecting a relationship be-
tween racketeering acts and a scheme] has obvious problems, however, be-
cause it effectively renders the "pattern" requirement superfluous. While
Congress never specified in Title IX what it meant by using the term "pat-
tern," it clearly did not state that it meant merely the commission of two acts
of racketeering activity within ten years .... Moreover, the failure to give
meaning to the "pattern" concept by requiring a common scheme would
appear to lead to undesirable and uncontemplated results. It is difficult to
conceive of a reason why the draconian penalties provided in RICO should
apply to a situation where corporate executives commit two distant and un-
related predicate offenses in pursuit of corporate affairs .... While RICO
surely is not intended to reach such activities, without a common scheme
[Vol. 15
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The second of the two concepts referenced in footnote four-
teen is that of "continuity." This concept is derived from sev-
eral sources in the congressional history. The original Senate
Report stated that "[t]he target of [RICO] is thus not sporadic
activity ... [but] the threat of continuing activity ... . Rep-
resentative Poff, one of the original sponsors of the bill, re-
ported that RICO was "not aimed at the isolated offender." 54
Most pre-Sedima decisions ignored this factor of continuity.
For example, in United States v. Weatherspoon,55 the Seventh Cir-
cuit held that five mailings as part of a single scheme to de-
fraud the Veterans Administration was sufficient to constitute a
pattern of racketeering activity.56 Likewise, in United States v.
Chovanec57 the court for the Southern District of New York
held that six acts of wire fraud in furtherance of one scheme
satisfied the pattern requirements of the statute.58 The same
court later noted in that "the major concern of Congress when
it enacted [RICO] was the special danger to legitimate busi-
ness of a continuity of racketeering activity", 59 and that a pat-
tern contemplates a prolonged course of conduct. 60
requirement or the like "[tihose who operate substantial and stable enter-
prises for long periods of time would become targets for RICO offenses
merely because the Government can compile all disparate offenses commit-
ted during the many years in which the enterprise is operated."
Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REV. 291, 351
(1983)).
53. SENATE REP., supra note 39, at 158.
54. 116 CONG. REC. 35193 (1970).
55. 581 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1978).
56. Id. at 602.
57. 467 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
58. Id. at 44. See also United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1039 (5th Cir. Unit
B 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982) (two separate crimes in furtherance of one
objective a conspiracy); United States v. Starnes, 644 F.2d 673, 678 (7th Cir.),-cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 826 (1981) (RICO applicable when one objective underlies several
acts); United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 441-42 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1105 (1975) (two fraudulent acts constitute one scheme); Beth Israel Medical
Center v. Smith, 576 F. Supp. 1061, 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (violation of mail and wire
fraud statutes sufficient for pattern); United States v. Salvitti, 451 F. Supp. 195, 200
(E.D. Pa.), aff'd mem., 588 F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1978) (single scheme involving series of
unlawful acts can establish pattern).
59. United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
60. United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 578 F.2d
1371 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978). The ABA in its Task Force Report
opined that:
This issue [of continuity] arises in its most extreme form where the predi-
cate offenses consist of no more than multiple mailings in furtherance of a
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At least one pre-Sedima decision dismissed a claim for failure
to satisfy the continuity concept. In 1981, the court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania held in Teleprompter of Erie, Inc.
v. City of Erie6 l that payment to a councilman of several bribes
at one fundraiser was not ongoing in nature and, thus, not a
pattern.62
Probably the most significant pre-Sedima pattern decision
was a 1975 Connecticut District Court case, United States v.
Moeller.63 In that case, the defendant was indicted for various
violations of federal law arising out of the destruction of a fac-
tory.64 Moeller was accused of committing arson by causing
the fire which destroyed one of the plants at his business, 65 and
also of kidnapping three employees from the plant on the same
day as the alleged arson.66 Additionally, the bill of particulars
alleged that Moeller and the other defendants violated RICO
by forming an enterprise to burn the plant, and that they con-
ducted the affairs of that enterprise by burning the plant and
kidnapping the three employees. 67
Judge Newman first turned to the question of whether a pat-
tern of racketeering activity had been properly alleged. He re-
luctantly held that a pattern had been sufficiently alleged and
that according to existing Second Circuit case law68 "the issue
has been authoritatively resolved in this Circuit .... A 'pat-
tern' can apparently be established in this Circuit by two acts
occurring on the same day in the same place and forming part
of the same criminal episode." 69 It is the judge's dicta, how-
single fraudulent scheme. Even though each of these mailings technically
constitutes a separate act of mail fraud, it appears that multiple acts of racke-
teering activity of this nature fall far short of the type of continuing activity
RICO was intended to address.
ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 204 (footnote omitted).
61. 537 F. Supp. 6 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
62. Id. at 12-13.
63. 402 F. Supp. 49 (D. Conn. 1975).
64. Id. at 53.
65. Id. at 57.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 58 (citing United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert
denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975)).
69. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. at 58 (citations and footnotes omitted). However, the
court also noted that:
It is arguable that Parness is distinguishable from the present case. In Parness
the acts held to constitute the pattern of racketeering activity and the con-
text in which they occurred supported an inference that they were part of a
pattern of continuing activity even though the acts were closely related in
[Vol. 15
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ever, which is significant to a discussion of pattern. While find-
ing that the arson and kidnapping constituted a pattern, the
judge stated:
Were the question open, I would have seriously doubted
whether the word "pattern" as used in Sec. 1962(c) should
be construed to mean two acts occurring in the same place
on the same day in the course of the same criminal episode.
While the statutory definition makes clear that a pattern can
consist of only two acts, I would have thought the common
sense interpretation of the word "pattern" implies acts oc-
curring in different criminal episodes, episodes that are at least
somewhat separated in time and place and yet still suffi-
ciently related by purpose to demonstrate a continuity of
activity.
70
In 1985, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Sedima, the
American Bar Association and the Department of Justice ex-
time. The crime charged in Parness was itself an activity of a continuing na-
ture, an elaborate scheme to accomplish the takeover of a hotel. By con-
trast, the crime charged in Count 8 appears to be a discrete criminal
venture, the arson of a building, even though some preparatory steps were
undoubtedly necessary.
Id. at n.7.
In Parness, a hotel was taken over through a pattern of racketeering activity con-
sisting of three acts: two acts of interstate transportation of stolen property and one
act of causing a person to travel in interstate commerce in furtherance of a scheme to
defraud. The three acts all occurred within five days of each other. Parness, 503 F.2d
at 438.
Apparently, Judge Newman distinguished the conduct of Parness from the con-
duct of Moeller by theorizing that the kidnapping in Moeller was only a ministerial act
necessary to the execution of the arson. The criminal object was the arson and the
kidnapping was simply coincidental. In contrast, the scheme to take over the hotel in
Parness required each of the three separate acts in order for the takeover to be suc-
cessfully concluded.
The above reasoning is correct only to the extent that the judge recognized the
necessity of separate, independent decisions to engage in criminal conduct as a basis
for a pattern to exist. However, the takeover in Parness was, in reality, the manifesta-
tion of only one criminal decision-the decision to take over a business. This deci-
sion simply required three racketeering acts to succeed. The arson in Moeller was
similarly the product of only one criminal decision that required two racketeering
acts for its implementation. The fact that the kidnapping in Moeller was only coinci-
dental should be irrelevant. Without more, the defendants in Parness and in Moeller
both engaged in one criminal activity. Their conduct was thus "sporadic" and pro-
vides no "threat of ongoing activity." See SENATE REP., supra note 39, at 158.
Two decisions by Judge Getzendanner of the Northern District of Illinois in
1985 and 1986 are illustrative of the idea of separate and independent criminal deci-
sions. See Medical Emergency Serv. Assocs. v. Foulke, 633 F. Supp. 156 (N.D. Ill.
1986); Graham v. Slaughter, 624 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. Ill. 1985). See also Note, RICO:
Limiting Suits By Altering The Pattern, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 177, 197-98 (1986).
70. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. at 57 (emphasis in original).
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pressed the view that single criminal episodes should not be
encompassed by RICO. 71 The ABA Criminal Justice Section
specifically recommended adoption of the analysis of Judge
Newman in Moe/ler.72 The ABA Task Force stated in its report
that the pattern requirement:
[W]as intended as a means of limiting RICO to those cases
where the required predicate offenses were committed in a
manner which characterizes the perpetrator as a person who
commonly commits such crimes. Only by requiring multi-
ple predicate offenses occurring in two or more separate
criminal episodes, can this goal be achieved in the RICO
statute.
73
The ABA Task Force recommended that the statute be
amended to require "(i) that the underlying predicate offenses
be connected to each other by a common scheme; and (ii) that
the underlying predicate offenses arise in two or more separate
criminal episodes."
74
71. ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 206-07.
72. See ABA Report to the House of Delegates Section of Criminal Justice, Aug.,
1982 at 5-6.
73. ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 207-08.
74.. Id. at 208. There are several problems with this approach. First, requiring a
relationship of predicate offenses to a common scheme can lead to the exclusion of
certain Section 1962(b) conduct. Consider the hotel takeover in United States v. Par-
ness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975). That takeover
clearly involved the acquisition of an enterprise by means of predicate offenses. This
is the type of infiltration of legitimate business about which Congress was concerned
when it enacted RICO. If the defendants had been more innovative, taking over the
hotel by committing only one predicate act, for instance by interstate transportation
of only one stolen cashier's check or perhaps extortion, then there could be no pat-
tern because there would only be one racketeering act. If the same defendants had
earlier taken over other businesses through the use of racketeering acts, such con-
duct could not be considered as part of a pattern under the ABA Task Force proposal
since the earlier takeovers would not be part of a "common scheme." Thus, under
the Task Force proposal, RICO would be unavailable as a tool against defendants
who had demonstrated repeated, ongoing use of predicate acts to take over legiti-
mate businesses-an untenable result. So long as those defendants were able to
avoid the use of multiple predicate acts to accomplish any one takeover, they would
be immune from attack under RICO.
Such a scenario is not far-fetched. Consider a group of hypothetical criminals
with a reputation for violence in a small ethnic section of a large city. Perhaps the
first target for the hypothetical criminals was a small, neighborhood store and the
conduct was not a takeover but simply the extortion of protection money. The next
target for the hypothetical criminals is a local bakery in the same neighborhood. By
repeating this process a number of times, these criminals could avoid RICO so long
as each criminal activity employed the commission of only one predicate act. The
fruits of each activity contribute to an increasing accumulation of ill-gotten funds for
these criminals which enables them to move on to bigger and better targets. Our
[Vol. 15
16
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 11
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol15/iss1/11
RICO PATTERN REQUIREMENT
IV. THE SEDIMA DECISION
On July 1, 1985, the United States Supreme Court decided
Sedima, S. P.R. L. v. Imrex Co. 75 The plaintiff, a Belgian corpora-
tion, had entered into a joint business venture with the defend-
ant, a New York corporation. The purpose of the joint venture
was to provide electronic components to a Belgian firm. 76 The
buyer would order the parts through Sedima; Imrex would ob-
tain the parts in the United States and ship them to Europe.
The two parties, Sedima and Imrex, would then split the net
proceeds. 77 After about three years, Sedima believed that Im-
rex was inflating the bills, thus overcharging Sedima and cheat-
ing it out of a portion of the proceeds by collecting for
nonexistent expenses.
78
Sedima filed a claim in federal court in the Eastern District of
New York. In addition to common law claims which included
unjust enrichment, conversion, and breach of contract, the
complaint also alleged two counts under section 1962(c) based
on predicate acts of mail and wire fraud, and one count alleg-
ing a conspiracy to violate section 1962(c).
79
The district court dismissed the RICO counts, holding that a
RICO injury must be some sort of injury distinct from the di-
rect injury resulting from the predicate acts. 80 According to
the district court, the injury must be a distinct racketeering in-
jury or competitive injury. 8' The Second Circuit affirmed on
this issue, holding that the plaintiff in a RICO case must allege
an injury different in kind from the injury which occurred as a
result of the predicate acts. The injury must arise, according
to the Second Circuit, by some activity which RICO was in-
tended to deter. 82 The Second Circuit also held that the com-
plaint was defective for failing to allege that the defendants
hypothetical criminals have now become the type of "person[s] who commonly [com-
mit] such crimes." ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 208. Because none of
the separate and independent activities are related or connected by a common
scheme, there is no RICO violation if the Task Force's recommendation of a common
scheme relationship requirement is followed. See, e.g., Note, supra note 52, at 94-95.
75. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
76. Id. at 483.
77. Id. at 483-84.
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had already been criminally convicted of the predicate acts al-
leged or of some other RICO violations. 83
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit,
and remanded the case for trial.8 4 First, the Court held that no
prior criminal conviction was required by the statute and, in
fact, every indication from the language of the statute itself, its
history, and considerations of policy were to the contrary.
8 5
Next, the Court found that RICO did not require a separate
racketeering injury.8 6 The Court stated that a RICO violation
exists whenever (1) a defendant engages in a pattern of racke-
teering activity in a manner forbidden by sections 1962(a-c)
and (2) these activities injure the plaintiff.8 7 "Racketeering ac-
tivity," the Court pointed out, "consists of no more and no less
than commission of the predicate acts." 88
It was during this discussion of "racketeering injury" that
Justice White, writing for the majority in the five to four deci-
sion, commented on the question of how pattern might be in-
terpreted. In footnote fourteen of the opinion,89 Justice White
first mentioned that the definition of a "pattern of racketeering
activity" differed from certain other of the definitions in sec-
tion 1961 in that it states that a pattern "requires" at least two
acts, whereas most of the other definitions use the term
"means" to define the subject.90 The implication, according to
Justice White, was that "while two acts are necessary, they may
83. Id. at 485.
84. Id. at 500. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of separate
racketeering injury "[i]n light of the variety of approaches taken by the lower
courts .. ." Id. at 486.
85. Id. at 493. For example, the Court pointed out that such a requirement (of a
prior criminal conviction) would apply "nonsensically" to a criminal prosecution. Id.
at 488. Thus, the Court recognized that there can't be one interpretation of the
statute's provisions for criminal purposes and a different, more restrictive interpreta-
tion for Civil defendants.
86. Id. at 495.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 496 n.14.
90. Id. Actually, of the ten definitions contained in section 1961, only five of
them use the term "means" ("racketeering activity" at § 1961(1); "State" at
§ 1961(2); "unlawful debt" at § 1961(6); "racketeering investigator" at § 1961(7);
and "racketeering investigation" at § 1961(8)). Four of the remaining five use the
term "includes" to define the subject of the definition ("person" at § 1961(3); "en-
terprise" at § 1961(4); "documentary material" at § 1961(9); and "Attorney Gen-
eral" at § 1916(10)). Thus, only "pattern of racketeering activity" at § 1961(5) uses
the word "requires." 18 U.S.C. § 1961.
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not be sufficient." 9' The same point was made by Justice Pow-
ell in his dissent: "The definition of 'pattern' may thus logi-
cally be interpreted as meaning that the presence of the
predicate act is only the beginning: something more is re-
quired for a 'pattern' to be proved."
92
BothJustice White for the majority andJustice Powell in his
dissent quoted language from the Senate Report which stated
that "sporadic activity" was not a target of RICO.93 Both re-
ferred to legislative history to support the proposition that a
threat of ongoing activity, rather than isolated acts, was neces-
sary for a pattern to exist: "It is this factor of continuity plus
relationship which combines to produce a pattern."
94
Both the majority and the dissent mentioned the concept of
relationship. In footnote fourteen, Justice White quoted one
of the sponsor of the bill, Senator McClellan, who stated on
the Senate floor that "the term 'pattern' itself requires the
showing of a relationship .... So, therefore, proof of two acts
of racketeering activity, without more, does not establish a pat-
tern. ... 95 Justice Powell, in his dissenting opinion, discussed
the ABA Task Force recommendation that a pattern should re-
quire that the racketeering acts be related to each other by
some common scheme. 96 He suggested that by so construing
pattern, "courts could go a long way toward limiting the reach
of the statute to its intended target-organized crime."
97
However, Justice White stated in the majority opinion that
"the compensable injury necessarily is the harm caused by
predicate acts sufficiently related to constitute a pattern,for the
essence of the violation is the commission of those acts in connection with
the conduct of an enterprise.-
98
Finally, the majority, in footnote fourteen, commented that
the definition of "pattern" enacted by Congress in Title X of
the same bill, a provision relating to sentencing guidelines for
repeat offenders, might "be useful" in interpreting the phrase
91. 473 U.S. at 496 n.14.
92. Id. at 527.
93. Id. at 496 n.14, 527.
94. Id. at 496 n. 14 (quoting SENATE REP., supra note 39, at 158).
95. Id. (quoting 116 CONG. REC. 18940 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan)).
96. 473 U.S. at 528.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 497 (emphasis added).
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pattern of racketeering activity: 99 "Significantly, in defining
'pattern' in a later provision of the same bill, Congress was
more enlightening: 'criminal conduct forms a pattern if it em-
braces criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes,
results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or
otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and
are not isolated events.' "100
In addition to footnote fourteen and Justice Powell's com-
ment in his dissenting opinion, the majority opinion provided
further invitation to courts to focus on the pattern requirement
as a vehicle for limiting the application of RICO to everyday
civil fraud cases:
We nonetheless recognize that, in its private civil version,
RICO is evolving into something quite different from the
original conception of its enactors. . . . The "extraordi-
nary" uses to which civil RICO has been put appear to be
primarily the result of the breadth of the predicate offenses,
in particular the inclusion of wire, mail and securities fraud,
and the failure of Congress and the courts to develop a
meaningful concept of "pattern."' 0 '
Thus, the Sedima decision, a decision which did not involve a
pattern question, created a new focus for the limitation of civil
RICO and launched a new era of heightened confusion with
respect to the question of what constitutes a pattern of racke-
teering activity.
V. POST-SEDIMA DECISIONS
Since Sedima, most courts have accepted the Supreme
Court's invitation to more closely examine the pattern require-
ment. For the most part, however, this effort has been limited
to an application of the phrase "continuity plus relationship,"
which was coined in footnote fourteen. 10 2 The cases have
99. Id. at 496 n.14 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e)).
100. 473 U.S. at 496 n.14 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (e)).
101. 473 U.S. at 500. But see United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1123 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980) (the failure of Congress to use the definition of
pattern for repeat offenders from 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) for a section 1961 pattern defi-
nition indicates that Congress intentionally chose to use the term differently). See
generally Note, supra note 69, at 188; Note, supra note 52, at 90. Cf. Russello v. United
States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983). "[W]here Congress includes particular language in one
section ... but omits it in another ... it is generally presumed that Congress acted
intentionally and purposefully." Id. at 23.
102. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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tended to fall into four categories, with the outcome of the in-
dividual cases turning on which test the court applies.
A. The Multiple Schemes Analysis
Most courts have had little trouble finding a "relationship"
in the alleged patterns presented to them. 10 3 Because of this,
103. For example, in Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1986), the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals considered an alleged pattern which consisted of the
theft of gas from an interstate pipeline, accomplished by means of several acts of mail
and wire fraud. The court found that the relationship half of the two-pronged "rela-
tionship plus continuity" test had been satisfied because the several acts of mail and
wire fraud were related to each other by virtue of being part of a scheme to convert
gas. Id. at 257. In doing so the court cited the Supreme Court's reference in foot-
note 14 of Sedima to the pattern requirement of the repeat offender statute to support
the proposition that Congress intended, in the repeat offender statute, "to isolate the
professional, long-term criminal elements in society." Id. at 257 n.7. The Eighth
Circuit noted that:
The Sedima Court also suggested that the courts look to the definition of
"pattern" in 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e), in giving meaning to RICO's "pattern of
racketeering activity" requirement. This definition construes pattern as a
series of related acts which "are not isolated events." Although our re-
search reveals no judicial interpretations of § 3575(e)'s pattern require-
ment, the legislative history behind this element indicates that it was
intended to isolate the professional, long-term criminal elements in society.
Id. The language cited by Judge Wangelin in this footnote appropriately focuses on
congressional intent applicable to RICO and the pattern requirement. See SENATE
REP., supra note 39.
[Title IX] has as its purpose the elimination of the infiltration of organized
crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in interstate
commerce.... There is rising awareness, in official circles and among all of
our people, of the depth of penetration of the forces of organized crime into the fabric
of our society and our commercial life.
Id. (emphasis added).
The definition of "pattern" in section 3575(e) is a tool for defining, for sentenc-
ing purposes, the repeat offender. To the degree that the congressional history relat-
ing to that section focuses on continuous criminal conduct, there is value in looking
at that history for the purpose of analyzing what constitutes a RICO pattern. With
RICO, as with the repeat offender sections, Congress was attempting to differentiate
between the isolated sporadic offender and the member of organized crime, the latter
being the true target of RICO. See, e.g., SENATE REP., supra note 39. "Subsection (1)
defines 'racketeering activity' to include those crimes most often associated with organized
crime. " Id. at 158 (emphasis added). See also Wilson, The Threat of Organized Crime:
Highlighting the Challenging New Frontiers in Criminal Law, 46 NOTRE DAME LAw. 41, 51
(1970). "Racketeering activity is defined in terms of repeated violations of specific
state and federal criminal statues now commonly violated by members of organized
crime." Id. "The Senate report [includes] listed offenses ... characteristic of organ-
ized crime. The listed offenses lend themselves to organized commercial exploita-
tion, unlike some other offenses such as rape, and experience has shown they are
commonly committed by participants in organized crime." McClellan, supra note 40,
at 142-43.
Repeated and continuous engagement in the type of conduct described by Con-
gress as "racketeering activity" is the identifying characteristic, then, of the person or
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continuity has been the primary focus subsequent to Sedima for
courts deciding the question of whether a pattern has been
properly alleged. The most restrictive construction has been
the Eighth Circuit's multiple scheme approach, which was first
enunciated in Superior Oil v. Fulmer.'0 4 While finding a proper
relationship between the alleged predicate acts of mail and
wire fraud, the Eighth Circuit found that the alleged pattern
lacked continuity because the conduct constituted only one
"continuing scheme"10 5 and that "[t]here was no proof that
the [defendants] had ever done these activities in the past and
there was no proof that they had engaged in other criminal
activities elsewhere." 0 6 The Eighth Circuit has followed Supe-
entity against whom RICO is targeted. It is this manner of conduct that spawns the
concept of continuity which is so regularly cited by courts following the Sedima deci-
sion. It is unfortunate, however, that the Supreme Court seized upon the catchy
phrase "continuity plus relationship" in footnote 14 of Sedima. 473 U.S. at 496 n. 14.
This phrase appears at 158 of the Senate Report and has not been adequately ana-
lyzed in context by courts when citing that phrase. Although the court found a rela-
tionship between the predicate acts, it held that the acts "failed to prove the
'continuity' sufficient to form a 'pattern of racketeering activity.' " 785 F.2d at 287.
The Seventh Circuit, in Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970 (7th Cir.
1986), also discussed "relationship," finding that "[rielationship implies that the
predicate acts were committed somewhat closely in time to one another, involve the
same victim, or involve the same type of misconduct." The court suggested that the
terms "continuity" and "relationship" are at odds with one another in that continuity
"embrace[s] predicate acts occurring at different points in time or involving different
victims." The court also stated that "to focus excessively on either continuity or rela-
tionship effectively negates the remaining prong."
At least one court since Sedima has found a lack of relationship in an alleged
pattern. In Zerman v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1509 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), the de-
fendant, E.F. Hutton, was alleged to have made a single misrepresentation to the
plaintiff with respect to the plaintiff's purchase of securities. In order to fit within the
RICO pattern requirement of "at least two acts of racketeering activity," the plaintiff
"seize[d] upon Hutton's recent well-publicized guilty plea in connection with its
overdrawing of its bank accounts." The court found that there was no relationship
between the alleged securities fraud act directed toward the plaintiff and the check
overdrafting.
104. 782 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1986).
105. Id. at 257.
106. Id. The court quoted Northern Trust Bank/O'Hara, N.A. v. Inryco, Inc., 615 F.
Supp. 828, 832 (N.D. Ill. 1985), which stated that "[iut is difficult to see how the
threat of continuing activity stressed in the Senate report could be established by a
single criminal episode. ... It places a real strain on the language to speak of a single
fraudulent effort, implemented by several fraudulent acts, as a 'pattern of racketeer-
ing activity.' " 785 F.2d at 257. In Northern Trust Judge Shadur recognized that au-
thority in the Seventh Circuit prior to Sedima had rejected a multiple scheme
approach. Northern Trust, 615 F. Supp. at 831-32, citing United States v. Starnes, 644
F.2d 673 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 454 U.S. 826 (1981). The judge stated, however, that
Sedima created a "whole new ballgame." 615 F. Supp. at 833. Accordingly, he noted
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nor Oil in at least five additional cases. 10 7
The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari for a
1987 case which includes the question of what constitutes a
pattern of racketeering activity. That case, H.J. Inc. v. North-
western Bell Telephone Co. ,108 involves a claim that illegal gratui-
ties were paid to members of the Minnesota Public Utilities
Commission to influence their rate-making decisions. 0 9 The
plaintiffs alleged that Northwestern Bell Telephone Company,
beginning in 1980, had provided to members of the Commis-
sion various gifts, parties, airlines tickets and employment of-
fers, "0 and that such practices continued through the time of
the suit.
In Northwestern Bell, the Eighth Circuit first addressed the re-
lationship prong of the "continuity plus relationship" test
from footnote fourteen of Sedima, by finding that the "relation-
ship prong is met when two or more racketeering acts are
shown to be in pursuit of the same overaching [sic]
scheme.""' As to continuity, however, the court held that "a
single fraudulent effort or scheme is insufficient,"' " 2 and that
in order for there to be sufficient continuity it must be alleged
that "Northwest Bell 'had engaged in similar endeavors in the
that since pattern requires a multiplicity of events, continuity must therefore mean
repeated criminal activity, not merely repeated acts to carry out the same activity. Id.
at 831.
For a criticism of the multiple scheme approach adopted in Northern Trust and
Superior Oil, see Blakey, supra note 6, at 203-08. "The issue [in Northern Trust] turns on
the factual characterization of the kickbacks as separate payments or installments of a
single payment." Id. at 205 (emphasis in original). "[Multiple schemes] would read
Section 1962(b) [acquiring an interest in an interstate business through a pattern of
racketeering activity] out of the statute .. " Id. at 206.
107. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tele. Co., 829 F.2d 648, 650 (8th Cir. 1987),
cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1219 (1988) (illegal gratuities to influence rate-making deci-
sions not a pattern); Allright Missouri, Inc. v. Billeter, 829 F.2d 631, 641 (8th Cir.
1987) (four year effort to deprive a number of limited partners of their real property
only one scheme and thus not a pattern); Madden v. Gluck, 815 F.2d 1163, 1164 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 86 (1987) (five thousand bad checks written over five
months, diverted corporate assets and false financial statements held to all be subdi-
visions of only one scheme to loot a business); Deviries v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc.,
805 F.2d 326, 329 (8th Cir. 1986) (churning of one account over six years only a
single scheme); Holmberg v. Morrisette, 800 F.2d 205, 209 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 107
S. Ct. 1953 (1986) (fraud in drawing upon three letters of credit only one scheme).
108. 829 F.2d at 648.
109. Id. at 649.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 650 (quoting Holmberg, 800 F.2d at 205).
112. 829 F.2d at 650.
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past or that [it was] engaged in other criminal activities.' ,113
The Eighth Circuit's "multiple scheme" approach has been
questioned by judges on that circuit bench and criticized by
other courts and commentators." t4 In Northwestern Bell, for ex-
ample, both Judge Gibson and Judge McMillan wrote separate
concurring opinions wherein they urged the Eighth Circuit to
reconsider the multiple scheme approach." 15 Even the author
113. Id. (quoting Deviries v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 805 F.2d 326, 329 (8th
Cir. 1986)). These tests set forth by the Eighth Circuit require first that the defend-
ant had either engaged in similar activities in the past or is engaged in other criminal
activities, and, second, that the predicate acts also relate to the particular scheme
alleged in the complaint. Northwestern Bell, 829 F.2d at 650. Seemingly, then, in or-
der to properly plead a pattern of racketeering activity in the Eighth Circuit, one
must allege both an ongoing scheme against the plaintiff with repeated predicate acts
as well as other schemes against the plaintiff or other victims involving any kind of
predicate acts. Id.
114. See, e.g., RICO UPDATE, supra note 20, at 206-07. "The... limitation is objec-
tionable from other perspectives; it would read Section 1962(b) out of the statute and
it might well conflict with Section 1962(d)." Id.
The two-schemes approach, however, contains many problems. First, it
may be so restrictive that it limits RICO's availability as a weapon in the
prosecutor's arsenal. The two-schemes approach coupled with a related-
ness element places prosecutors in the impractical situation of having to
show two completely separate schemes while showing also that the schemes
are related. A professional criminal could only benefit from a strict combi-
nation of both relatedness and continuity.
Perhaps the biggest problem with the two-schemes approach is its po-
tentially devastating effect on Civil RICO. Plaintiffs injured by racketeering
are usually the victims of one scheme to defraud, intimidate, or extort.
Under the two-schemes approach, a court would dismiss the typical Civil
RICO suit because the defendant could show easily that all his acts were part
of the same overall scheme to injure that victim .... Unless a plaintiff can
prove, that he was the victim of two separate schemes by the defendant,
therefore, which is not usually the case in Civil RICO, RICO's private attor-
ney general provision would be eviscerated:
Denenberg, supra note 34, at 375. See also Note, supra note 52, at 200.
The problems set forth in the Denenberg article would be alleviated if "relation-
ship" was analyzed only in terms of relevancy to the alleged conduct forming the
basis of the claim at issue. For example, evidence of past extortion of others would
be relevant to a claim based on an extortion "scheme." Similarly, evidence that a
public utility engages in predicate acts such as extortion, mail fraud or bribery in
order to gain a business advantage could be relevant in a separate claim based upon a
bribery "scheme." In both examples, the defendant has shown a propensity to utilize
related predicate acts as a way of doing business in a fashion similar to the claim
presented. See also Note, supra note 52, at 96. "Nowhere did the Supreme Court
contend that one comprehensive scheme involving several related unlawful actions
would not constitute a pattern." Id.
115. See Northwestern Bell, 829 F.2d at 650-51. Judge McMillan wrote, in part:
"I write separately only to state that I agree with Judge John R. Gibson that we
should reconsider our pattern of racketeering activity test, in light of the contrary
positions recently taken by several other Circuits." Id. (McMillan, J., concurring).
Judge Gibson wrote in dissent: "[T]he multiple scheme requirement that we have
[Vol. 15
24
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 11
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol15/iss1/11
RICO PATTERN REQUIREMENT
of the opinion, Senior Judge Henley, commented in a footnote
to the opinion "we are aware that our continuity plus relation-
ship approach to the pattern is not without criticism."116 Op-
ponents of the multiple scheme approach contend that this
method will allow defendants who have committed multiple
acts constituting a single scheme to escape RICO liability."
t 7
Although the Tenth Circuit has refused to define a specific
pattern test," 18 it is apparent from its post-Sedima decisions that
grafted on to the pattern element strays from the statutory language of RICO.... I
believe ... that when a proper case arises, the multiple scheme requirement should
be examined by the court en banc .... Id. at 651 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 650 n.3 (citations omitted).
117. Several Circuit Courts have explicitly rejected the Eighth Circuit's multiple
scheme approach. See Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat. State, 832 F.2d 36
(3d Cir. 1987) (requiring multiple schemes "plainly inconsistent with the purposes of
the statute"); Sun Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1987)
(multiple schemes unreasonably limits the reach of RICO); Roeder v. Alpha Ind.,
Inc., 814 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1987) (relieving from liability perpetrators of single, ongo-
ing schemes "untenable"); International Data Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149
(4th Cir. 1987) (multiple scheme requirement will lead to undesirable results);
United States v. Ianniello, 808 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3230
(1987) (requiring two schemes effectively eliminates § 1962(b)); Morgan v. Bank of
Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970 (7th Cir. 1986) (multiple schemes "focuses excessively on
continuity").
Probably the best summary of the criticism of the multiple scheme approach was
set forth in Paul S. Mullin &Associates, Inc. v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 532 (D. Del. 1986),
where the Delaware District Court stated:
This Court is loath to adopt a definition of pattern which turns on an assess-
ment of whether one or multiple criminal schemes is involved. Such a defi-
nition would be highly susceptible to manipulative semantics. For example,
an attempt by a racketeering enterprise to infiltrate General Motors could
involve countless acts of mail fraud, extortion, securities fraud, and bribery.
One could argue, however, that only one criminal scheme is involved be-
cause only one company was subverted. Under this view, a "pattern" would
come into existence only after the same enterprise began to infiltrate
Chrysler or Ford. On the other hand, the enterprise, in infiltrating General
Motors, undoubtedly had committed criminal acts of a sufficient number
and variety, over a sufficient period of time, to suggest the existence of an
elaborate design. This should be enough to create a "pattern."
Id. at 541. The court's reference is to 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b), which prohibits the acqui-
sition through a pattern of racketeering activity any enterprise which engages in in-
terstate commerce.
118. See Garbade v. Great Divide Mining & Milling Corp., 831 F.2d 212 (10th Cir.
1987).
Torwest decided what was not a pattern of racketeering activity, as did Condict
v. Condict .... We will do the same and again not attempt to construct an
affirmative definition of what would constitute such a pattern. Thus as was
said in Torwest: "In reaching this conclusion, we decline to go beyond the
facts before us to formulate a brightline test in the abstract."
Id. at 214 (quoting Torwest DBC, Inc. v. Dick, 810 F.2d 925, 929 (10th Cir. 1987)
(citations omitted, emphasis in original)).
19891
25
Dorigan and Edwall: A Proposed RICO Pattern Requirement for the Habitual Commercial O
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1989
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
it finds the rationale of the Eighth Circuit persuasive."t 9 For
example, the Tenth Circuit has noted that a "difficult question
is presented when the RICO claim is based on one scheme but
contemplates open-ended activity... and does not have a sin-
gle goal that, when achieved, will bring the activity to an
end."1
20
The District Court of Colorado, within the Tenth Circuit,
has produced what is probably the most intriguing multiple
scheme case of all. In re The Dow Co. "Sarabond" Products Liabil-
ity Litigation121 involved defendant Dow Chemical's Rule 12
motion to dismiss RICO claims against it in sixteen different
cases from district courts of the Third, Sixth, Eighth and Tenth
Circuits.12 2 The claims included products liability, negligence
and fraud claims against Dow arising out of its manufacture
119. See, e.g., Torwest, 810 F.2d at 929. In that case the Tenth Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of a RICO claim for failure to establish a pattern. The case involved a
"scheme" in which the defendants received secret profits from the sale of real estate
lots over a six year period. The court found that since there was only a single pur-
pose to the scheme, no pattern could exist.
120. Id. Following Torwest the Tenth Circuit drew closer to the Superior Oil ap-
proach in Condict v. Condict, 815 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1987). This case involved a claim
that the defendants had engaged in a scheme to take over a Wyoming ranch covering
thousands of acres through a pattern of racketeering activity, including acts of mail
and wire fraud. Id. at 580. In finding a lack of a pattern, the court quoted extensively
from its Torwest decision, commenting that the plaintiff in that case had failed because
it had only alleged "one scheme, one result, and one set of participants,'one victim,
one method of commission, and thus, no continuity and no pattern of racketeering
activity." Id. at 583. The court further stated that the claim was "but an unsuccessful
effort to dress a garden-variety fraud and deceit case in RICO clothing." Id. at 585.
Finally, the court noted that its interpretation of pattern was becoming increasingly
similar to that of the Eighth Circuit: "Other courts have interpreted the Supreme
Court's Sedima discussion on pattern in a similar fashion." Id. at 584 n.3 (citing
Holmberg v. Morrisette, 800 F.2d 205, 210 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
1953 (1987)); Superior Oil v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252, 257 (8th Cir. 1986).
See also Garbade, 831 F.2d at 212. In Garbade the defendant, the majority stock-
holder and an officer of Great Divide Mining and Milling Corporation, secretly with-
drew corporate income over a period of time in order to recover for certain loans he
had made to the company. The court found that his alleged conduct fit well into the
rule from Torwest: "[T]o achieve a single discrete objective does not in and of itself
create a threat of ongoing activity, even when that goal is pursued by multiple illegal
acts, because the scheme ends when the purpose is accomplished." Id. at 214. The
court therefore found an absence of the continuity element. Id.
121. 666 F. Supp. 1466 (D. Colo. 1987). Both Mr. Dorigan and Mr. Edwall, au-
thors of this article, represent plaintiffs in litigation against The Dow Chemical Com-
pany involving the product Sarabond. Those plaintiffs include the plaintiffs in
Behunin v. Dow Chemical Co., 650 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Colo. 1986). As of the date of
publication of this article, the litigation discussed in those opinions is still pending,
along with other litigation against Dow involving Sarabond.
122. Sarabond, 666 F. Supp. at 1470. The claims were before Colorado District
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and sale of a mortar additive known as Sarabond, a saran la-
tex. 123 The lawsuits also included claims that Dow, through a
pattern of racketeering activity, had marketed, sold and later
concealed defects involving Sarabond. 124
Prior to the motions in Dow Chemical, Judge Kane had dis-
missed all RICO claims in the Colorado-venued cases for fail-
ure to state a pattern. 25 Following that decision and the order
sending the federal Sarabond cases to Denver pursuant to the
Rules on Multidistrict Litigation, 26 Judge Kane allowed the
Colorado plaintiffs to amend their complaint to assert a sepa-
rate scheme involving a Dow roofing product that was also al-
legedly marketed and sold through a pattern of racketeering
activity based upon mail and wire fraud. 127 Dow again moved
Court Judge John L. Kane pursuant to an assignment by the Judicial Panel on Mul-
tidistrict Litigation. Id. at 1467-68.
123. Id. See also Behunin, 650 F. Supp. at 1467-68.
124. See First Amended Complaint, In re The Dow Company "Sarabond" Prod. Liab.
Litig., C.A. Assoc., et al. v. The Dow Chemical Co., MDL Docket No. 711, Civil Action No.
86-M- 1178 (D. Colo. 1986). Each alleged scheme set forth a series of acts of alleged
mail and wire fraud. In addition, within each RICO count, three separate schemes
are alleged as to each product: 1) "Schemes to conceal defects and misrepresent
nature of products for marketing and sales purposes"; 2) "Schemes to conceal de-
fects to continue sales and discourage litigation"; and 3) "Schemes to conceal defects
to limit liability on distressed structures." Id. at Para. 205.
125. See Behunin, 650 F. Supp. at 1387. In Behunin, one of the Sarabond cases, the
Colorado plaintiffs had alleged that Dow had engaged in at least three separate
schemes for each of four different saran latex products. The alleged schemes in-
volved acts of mail and wire fraud to (1) market and sell the products; (2) later con-
ceal product defects so that sales could continue; and (3) later yet, bring about unfair
settlements of claims. The alleged pattern of racketeering activity occurred over a
fifteen year period, involving dozens of victims. Id. at 1390. Judge Kane held that
the alleged conduct was only one fraudulent scheme, accompanied by a "multiplicity
of underlying predicate acts." Id. at 1389-90 (citing Garbade v. Great Divide Mining
and Milling Corp., 645 F. Supp. 808 (D. Colo. 1986), aff'd 831 F.2d 212 (10th Cir.
1987)).
In Behunin the judge also cited as support a case from the Southern District of
New York, Savastano v. Thompson Medical Co., 640 F. Supp. 1081 (S.D.N.Y. 1986),
wherein a RICO claim involving an over-the-counter appetite suppressant had been
dismissed because the alleged fraudulent packaging and marketing was only a "single
fraudulent effort, implemented by several fraudulent acts." 650 F. Supp. at 1390.
The language quoted by the court also included a citation to Northern Trust
Bank/O'Hare, N.A. v. Inryco Co., 615 F. Supp. 828, 831 (N.D. Ill. 1985), an opinion
relied on by the Eighth Circuit in Superior Oil. "On the facts of this case, we agree
with the court's conclusion [in Northern Trust] that '[i]t is difficult to see how the threat
of continuing activity.., could be established by a single criminal episode.' " 640 F.
Supp. at 1473.
126. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 Multidistrict Litigation. See also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITI-
GATION, SECOND, § 31.12 (1985).
127. Sarabond, 666 F. Supp. at 1473.
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to dismiss the RICO claims but this time Judge Kane recog-
nized "at least two fraudulent schemes-Dow's efforts to mar-
ket two distinct lines of products."1 28
In reaching his conclusion, Judge Kane stated his view of the
Tenth Circuit's position concerning pattern. In reviewing the
Tenth Circuit's opinions on pattern, the judge commented that
even an allegation of more than one scheme does not end the
inquiry: 1
29
[P]attern is not meaningfully defined unless the term
"scheme" is itself cloaked in some fairly determinable con-
cept. This last task is a difficult one. The thrust of my own
RICO pattern decisions has been that a "scheme" corre-
sponds to a substantially discrete aim or goal. At base,
though, a determination of whether a pattern exists "de-
pends on the nature of the conduct under all of the
circumstances."'1
0
He then briefly discussed some of the pattern requirements
in the Tenth Circuit, including the criterion that conduct might
be a pattern if the circumstances suggest that the activity is not
an isolated incident.' 3 ' The judge considered each alleged
scheme: marketing fraud; subsequent concealment; and fraud-
ulent handling of claims, as only one isolated incident. The
judge also rejected the assertion that the separate products
frauds constituted distinct schemes.'
3 2
128. Id. Judge Kane stated that he was "presented with claims arising from Dow's
marketing of the product Sarabond, of the saran latex family line of products." Id.
He goes on to state that "[iln this vein, I have relied on Savastano ... in determining
that the marketing of a single product constitutes only a single fraudulent scheme."
Id. This was the only suggestion in the two opinions as to why the judge, in Behunin,
rejected the alleged fraud relating to Dow's other saran products as additional
schemes.
Clearly, the judge considered all the acts of fraud with respect to the marketing,
sales and claims involving the separate products to be part of only one scheme. This
was his apparent conclusion even though all four of the products were sold to differ-
ent groups of purchasers, at different periods of time and by different departments
within a certain Dow division. 666 F. Supp. at 1473.
129. Id. at 1472.
130. Id. (citations omitted).
131. Id. at 1471 (citing Torwest, 666 F. Supp. at 929).
132. In Savastano v. Thompson Medical Co., Inc., 640 F. Supp. 1081 (S.D.N.Y. 1986),
the issue was whether the alleged fraudulent marketing and packaging of a single
product constituted a pattern of racketeering activity. Assuming, for the sake of ar-
gument, the correctness ofJudge Kane's view, the facts in Savastano represented only
"a single fraudulent effort [or scheme], implemented by several fraudulent acts." Id.
at 1085.
Contrast this analysis with that in the Sarabond litigation. First, Dow was accused
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B. The Liberal Approach
At the opposite end of the spectrum of pattern in a criminal
setting is the position adopted by the Fifth Circuit in R.A.G.S.
Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt.133 R.A.G.S. involved a claim that the de-
fendant had attempted to defraud the plaintiff company by
twice mailing fraudulent invoices to the plaintiff.'3 4 The dis-
trict court had dismissed the RICO count on the grounds that
there was evidence of only one act of mail fraud.135 The Fifth
Circuit reversed, finding that the question of whether defend-
ant had committed one act of mail fraud or two was a jury
question.' 3 6 In response to an argument that two acts might
not be sufficient to constitute a pattern, the Fifth Circuit held
that two such acts of mail fraud, by virtue of being related to
each other, could constitute a pattern.' 37
Subsequent Fifth Circuit cases have criticized the R.A.G.S.
decision.' 38 For example, in Montesano v. Seafirst Commercial
of fraud in the marketing and sale of Sarabond. See First Amended Complaint, supra
note 125. That accusation is the equivalent of the conduct found lacking by the court
in Savastano. However, the alleged "schemes" in the Dow cases go further. The alle-
gations as to other saran latex products are certainly distinct schemes. These sales
were at somewhat different times, to different people and for different purposes.
Again, these alleged facts represent a conscious decisional process by the defendant
to use racketeering acts in order to gain a business advantage.
It appears, however, that the Tenth Circuit follows a different test for pattern in
a criminal setting. In United States v. Killip, 819 F.2d 1542 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 505 (1987), the court affirmed the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a de-
fendant's conviction of a RICO conspiracy charge. The case involved drug conspir-
acy charges against members of the Outlaw Motorcycle Club. The defendant was
indicted for conspiring to engage in three racketeering acts: (1) Ten Florida drug
transactions; (2) a kidnapping; and (3) interstate transportation of drug money. Id. at
1548-49. The court sustained the conviction, finding that the Florida drug transac-
tions and the one act of interstate transportation of drug money were sufficient to
satisfy a conspiracy to engage in a pattern of racketeering activity. Id. at 1549. The
Tenth Circuit, in the same opinion, reversed the conviction of defendant Teague
because the evidence did not support his involvement in two predicate acts. Id. at
1548. The court found that the evidence supported a finding that he had partici-
pated in a Belleville, Illinois drug sale to undercover officers but did not support a
finding that he had conspired to engage in another drug distribution in Oklahoma.
Id. Because he had only committed one predicate act, he could not be found guilty of
conspiracy to participate on a pattern of racketeering activity. Id.
133. 774 F.2d 1350 (5th Cir. 1985).
134. Id. at 1352.
135. Id. at 1354.
136. Id. at 1354-55.
137. Id. at 1355.
138. See Crocker v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 826 F.2d 347, 348 n.2 (5th Cir.
1987); Montesano v. Seafirst Commercial Corp., 818 F.2d 423, 425-26 (5th Cir.
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Corp. ,39 the Fifth Circuit was asked to redefine pattern of rack-
eteering activity but declined to do so, instead "bow[ing] to
R.A.G.S. but urg[ing] that it be overturned en banc."'
40
The panel in Montesano was "persuaded that the court should
change course in order to faithfully serve congressional pur-
pose." 14I However, it noted that such a change in the pattern
requirement would have to be made by the entire Fifth Circuit
sitting en banc.142 Accordingly, the court, in dicta, stated that
the test for pattern ought to exclude racketeering acts "prepar-
atory to the accomplishment of a discrete offense."'
143
The Eleventh Circuit has also adopted a liberal approach to
the pattern issue. In Bank of America National Trust & Savings
Association v. Touche Ross & Co. ,144 five banks which had pro-
vided financing to a now bankrupt corporation sued the ac-
counting firm and the accountants who had prepared that
corporation's financial statements. The banks alleged that the
defendants had committed nine separate acts of wire and mail
fraud over three years for the purpose of inducing the banks to
extend credit to the corporation. 45 The court held that the
separate acts of mail fraud involving the same parties for the
purpose of inducing credit satisfied the standards promulgated
by the Supreme Court in footnote fourteen of Sedima. 146 The
court also held that "[a]cts that are part of the same scheme or
transaction can qualify as distinct predicate acts" for the pur-
1987). See generally Smith v. Cooper/T. Smith Corp., 846 F.2d 325, 329 (5th Cir.
1988).
139. 818 F.2d at 423.
140. Id. at 426.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 425-26. The Montesano court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs'
RICO claim, nonetheless, because the complaint failed to allege an enterprise sepa-
rate and distinct from the pattern. The court held that an association-in-fact enter-
prise must have an ongoing organization or be a continuing unit, such that the
enterprise has an existence that can be defined apart from the commission of the
predicate acts. Id. at 427.
143. Id. The Montesano court agreed with the view enunciated in Torwest DBC, Inc.
v. Dick, 810 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1987), which held that "[a] scheme to achieve a single
discrete objective does not in and of itself create a threat of on going activity, even
when that goal is pursued by multiple illegal acts, because the scheme ends when the
purpose is accomplished." Id. at 928-29.
144. See Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Touche Ross Co., 782 F.2d
966 (11 th Cir. 1986).
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pose of finding a pattern. 147
Thus, at one end of the spectrum is the multiple scheme ap-
proach spawned by the Eighth Circuit's 1986 decision in Supe-
rior Oil, while at the other end are both the Fifth Circuit's
position that two racketeering acts are sufficient if they are re-
lated 48 and the liberal interpretation of the Eleventh Circuit.
C. The Criminal Episode Test
A third approach, the criminal episodes analysis, has devel-
oped out of the Seventh Circuit. One of the earliest decisions
after Sedima interpreting pattern to require more than a
number of predicate acts was Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare N.A.
v. Inryco, Inc. 149 In Inyco a construction contract kickback
scheme was alleged to violate RICO because the scheme was
implemented through a number of payments using the mail.150
Five kickbacks were made from December, 1979 through Octo-
ber, 1980 in furtherance of this scheme to defraud.' 5 1 In find-
ing that a pattern did not exist, Judge Shadur stated that "true
enough, 'pattern' connotes similarity, hence the cases' proper
emphasis on the relatedness of the constituent acts. But 'pat-
tern' also connotes a multiplicity of events: Surely the con-
tinuity inherent in the term presumes repeated criminal activity,
not merely repeated acts to carry out the same criminal activ-
ity.'1 52 Inryco has become a leading case cited by those courts
attempting to define pattern in terms of repeated criminal ac-
tivity as opposed to repeated criminal acts to carry out a single
147. 782 F.2d at 971. See also Durham v. Business Mgmt. Assoc., 847 F.2d 1505
(1 th Cir. 1988); United States v. Watchmaker, 761 F.2d 1459, 1460 (11 th Cir. 1985).
In Durham, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the defendants' motion for
summary judgment relating to the question of whether a pattern had been properly
alleged. The defendants argued that a second scheme of fraudulent conduct involv-
ing a set of investors other than plaintiffs was too dissimilar from the scheme which
had damaged the plaintiffs to be considered as part of a pattern. 847 F.2d at 1512.
The court rejected that argument, finding that the degree of similarity of the two
schemes was a fact question in light of 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e). Id.
148. See R.A.G.S. Couture Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350 (5th Cir. 1985).
149. 615 F. Supp. 828 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (two acts of kickback scheme did not estab-
lish a pattern).
150. Id. at 830.
151. Id. at 828-30.
152. Id. at 831 (emphasis in original).
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criminal transaction. 53
An example of the application of the criminal episodes ap-
proach to a civil fraud case is provided by Techreations, Inc. v.
National Safety Council.154 The plaintiff alleged that it had been
damaged by the defendant through a pattern of racketeering
activity consisting of two separate schemes. 55 The first
scheme allegedly involved the fraudulent use of the mails and
wire to induce plaintiff to enter into the contract.' 56 The sec-
ond scheme also involved mail and wire fraud to induce the
contract's modification. 57 The RICO defendant then induced
the National Safety Council to breach the contract, causing
damages to the plaintiff.1
58
In dismissing the RICO claim, Judge Getzendanner stated
that a pattern " 'requires more than a single transaction' but
153. See, e.g., Condict v. Condict, 826 F.2d 923, 929 n.3 (10th Cir. 1987); Superior
Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252, 257 (8th Cir. 1985).
Analysis following Inryco has been altered to a degree by the Eighth Circuit's
adoption of the multiple scheme approach. This approach, represented by Superior
Oil, requires proof of different "schemes" of illegal conduct in order to impose RICO
liability. This test takes the continuity element one step further than Inryco. Under
Inryco the analysis centered on whether there was repeated activity, while in the Superior
Oil analysis, the focus is on whether there is more than one distinct "scheme." Supe-
rior Oil, 785 F.2d at 257. The Eighth Circuit has indicated that a separate "scheme"
can be found by asking whether the defendant "had ever done these activities in the
past ... [or was] engaged in other criminal activities elsewhere." Id.
The Tenth Circuit's position is not yet clear enough unequivocally to label it a
"multiple scheme" or "multiple episode" test. All three opinions, Torwest, Condict,
and Garbade v. Great Divide Mining and Milling Corp., 831 F.2d 212 (10th Cir. 1987), fall
short of articulating a test and instead point to both the Eighth and Seventh Circuit
tests. "Any threat of continuing activity.., was eliminated when [defendants] were
removed from the boards of Torwest and Torwest DBC." Torwest, 810 F.2d at 929.
However, in the same opinion the court mentioned that the "[plaintiff] did not allege
... anything to suggest that these defendants actually undertook or planned to un-
dertake any other fraudulent activity." Id. The first comment indicates that one
open-ended scheme might be enough but the second comment is actually a para-
phrase of the Eighth Circuit's multiple scheme test as stated in Superior Oil. 785 F.2d
at 257.
154. 650 F. Supp. 337 (N.D. Ill. 1986). The plaintiff, a developer of computer
software, alleged that the defendant had fraudulently induced plaintiff to enter into a
contract with the National Safety Council to provide a software system for a defensive
driving course. Id. Initially, the contract's terms covered only California. Later, it
was amended to add the rest of the nation. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 338-39.
157. Id. at 339-40.
158. Id. at 338.
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'not necessarily more than a single scheme.' "159 In addition,
according to Judge Getzendanner, an episode is determined by
looking for an injury of "independent harmful significance"
arising from the particular episode.
160
The two schemes alleged by the plaintiff in Techreations
lacked several critical features of a criminal episode. 161 First,
the modification of the contract was not sufficiently separated
in time and place from the original contract so as to constitute
a separate criminal episode or transaction.162 Second, the eco-
nomic damages suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the con-
tract modification, are distinct from those damages caused by
breach of the original contract terms, and therefore did not
create a separate injury. 63 Rather than being truly distinct in-
juries, they were, relatively speaking, simultaneous and not
separated in time and place. t64 They both arose out of the
same overall breach of contract.
Third, all of the alleged predicate acts of mail and wire fraud
arose out of an effort to achieve a single contract breach. The
modification of the contract, which plaintiff sought to boot-
strap into a separate scheme or episode, was not sufficiently
separated in time and place to be considered an independent
criminal episode.1
65
Finally the alleged predicate acts contemplated a limited, fi-
nite and close-ended objective: profiting from the contract's
breach. The acts therefore lacked the open-ended nature of a
pattern. 1
66
159. 650 F. Supp. at 339 (quoting Graham v. Slaughter, 624 F. Supp. 222, 235
(N.D. Ill. 1985)). The opinion stated that:
For criminal acts to constitute separate "transactions" or "episodes," they
must be "somewhat separated in time and place." Mere "ministerial acts
performed in the execution of a single fraudulent transaction" and not
themselves "independently motivated crimes" do not create a pattern within
the meaning of RICO, even though technically each may be a mail fraud
violation. Moreover, "an open-ended scheme may include a sufficient
number of independent criminal episodes" to form a pattern.
650 F. Supp. at 339.
160. Id. (quoting Ghouth v. Conticommodity Serv., Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1325, 1336
(N.D. Ill. 1986)).




165. Id. at 341.
166. Id. The Techreations analysis has been adopted by the courts of the Southern
District of New York. See, e.g., Franklin & Joseph, Inc. v. Continental Health Ind.,
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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has adopted a form of
the criminal episodes analysis. In Medical Emergency Service Asso-
ciates S.C. v. Foulke, 16 7 the court considered the propriety of a
RICO claim involving a breach of contract to provide emer-
gency services to a hospital. The plaintiff had entered into a
contract with a hospital to provide medical staff to that hospi-
tal's emergency room. As required by that contract, the plain-
tiff also entered into individual contracts with various doctors,
including defendants, to supervise the employees of the plain-
tiff staffing the emergency room.
168
The defendants eventually decided to form a corporation to
compete with the plaintiff and, thus, to replace the plaintiff
with their own corporation. This decision was implemented,
allegedly, through mail and wire fraud constituting a pattern of
racketeering activity. 169 The district court judge dismissed the
RICO claim, finding that, although the numerous alleged
predicate acts of mail and wire fraud would constitute separate
offenses, together, "there [was] a single wrongful transaction
and a single injury."'
170
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit emphasized the necessity
that a pattern requires "separate and distinct episodes of
fraud" with a "coordinated scheme to defraud the plaintiff.''7
The plaintiff in this case had only alleged one criminal epi-
sode-the defendants' attempt to replace the plaintiff as the
provider of emergency room services. Labeling the conduct
into various "subschemes," with numerous predicate acts as a
part thereof, did not convert the defendants' conduct into a
Inc., 664 F. Supp. 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Savastano v. Thompson Medical Co., 640 F.
Supp. 1081 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Soper v. Simmons Int'l Ltd., 632 F. Supp. 244, 253-54
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (pattern requires multiple racketeering acts occurring in different
criminal episodes).
167. 844 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1988).
168. Id. at 392-93.
169. Id. at 393.
170. Id. at 394 (quoting Medical Emergency Serv. Assoc. S.C. v. Foulke, 633 F.
Supp. 156, 157 (N.D. Ill. 1986)).
The Foulke Court held that in order for predicate acts to be sufficiently continu-
ous to amount to a pattern of racketeering activity, the acts "must be ongoing over an
identified period of time so that they can fairly be viewed as constituting separate transac-
tions, i.e. 'transactions somewhat separated in time and place.' . . . And at the same time,
there must be a 'relationship among activities-i.e., activities leading up to coordi-
nated action.' " 844 F.2d at 395 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
171. Id. at 395. In the earlier decision, Marshall &Ilsley Trust Co. v. Pate, 819 F.2d
806, 809-10 (7th Cir. 1987), the Seventh Circuit held that not all of the alleged sepa-
rate episodes need be directed toward, or injure, the plaintiff.
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pattern of racketeering activity. 172 Instead, the defendants' ac-
tivities constituted a "one-shot" effort to defraud a single vic-
tim and to inflict a single injury.1 73 The Seventh Circuit has
also held that acts in furtherance of a single scheme can qualify
as a pattern if the acts occur as part of separate criminal
episodes. 174
A number of district courts in the Sixth Circuit have also
adopted a criminal episodes approach. 75 A lack of civil opin-
ions at the circuit court level in the Sixth Circuit makes it diffi-
cult to determine what test that circuit will employ.'
76
However, the district court decisions have taken a clear crimi-
172. 844 F.2d at 397-98.
173. Id. at 397 (quoting Marks v. Pannell Kerr Forster, 811 F.2d 1108, 1112 (7th
Cir. 1987)).
174. For example, in Appley v. West, 832 F.2d 1021 (7th Cir. 1987), the beneficiary
of a trust alleged that the trustee defrauded her of substantial assets by embezzling
trust funds. The predicate acts consisted of fraudulent mailing of monthly bank
statements and cancelled checks in order to conceal the trustee's conversion of the
plaintiff's funds. The court found that a pattern existed because the trustee had
sought to defraud the plaintiff twice through two predicate acts of mail fraud, causing
a separate and distinct injury both times, those injuries being the embezzlement of
two distinct sums of money. Id. at 1028. The court stated that "[w]hether a RICO
'pattern' exists is clearly a 'fact-specific question encompassing many relevant fac-
tors,' including: (1) the number and variety of predicate acts and the length of time
over which they were committed; (2) the number of victims; (3) the presence of sepa-
rate schemes; and (4) the occurrence of distinct injuries." Id. at 1027 (quoting Mar-
shall, 819 F.2d at 809-10). See also Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297, 1305
(7th Cir. 1987) ("repeated infliction of economic injury upon a single victim of a
single scheme is sufficient to establish a pattern").
The distinction drawn by the Seventh Circuit in Liquid Air and Appley is the ongo-
ing, repeated "systematic illegal conduct continuing over time" coupled with the oc-
currence of more than one distinct injury. Such conduct caused separate and distinct
injuries to the plaintiffs in Appley and Liquid Air, yet the conduct in both cases was in
furtherance of only one criminal objective. There was no decision to engage in crimi-
nal activity separate in time and place from another, independent decision. There
was no evidence of such separate and distinct conduct with respect to any other vic-
tims. Accordingly, these two cases don't truly follow the criminal episode test.
175. See Omega Constr. Co., Inc. v. Altman, 667 F. Supp. 453 (W.D. Mich. 1987);
Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 656 F. Supp. 49 (S.D. Ohio 1986);
Millers Cove Energy Co. v. Domestic Energy Serv. Co., 646 F. Supp. 520 (E.D. Mich.
1986); McIntyre's Mini Computer Sales Group, Inc. v. Creative Synergy Corp., 644 F.
Supp. 580 (E.D. Mich. 1986); In Re Evening News Ass'n Tender Offer Lit., 642 F.
Supp. 860 (E.D. Mich. 1986); Zahra v. Charles, 639 F. Supp. 1405 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
176. See, e.g., State of Michigan v. Fawaz d/b/a West Seven Mile Serv. and
Froggy's Fill-up, Inc., 848 F.2d 194, RICO Bus. Disp. Guide 6936 (6th Cir. 1988)
(unpublished decision). This appears to be the only case thus far decided by the
Sixth Circuit outside a criminal setting in which the question arises as to what consti-
tutes a pattern of racketeering activity.
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nal episodes stance.1
77
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a May 1988 unpub-
lished decision, State of Michigan v. Fawaz,178 affirmed the dis-
missal of a RICO claim based upon the mailing of fraudulent
tax returns by defendant's gas stations over the course of one
year. 179
The Circuit Court affirmed the dismissal, stating:
By enacting [RICO], Congress took aim at racketeering ac-
tivity, providing criminal sanctions against those engaged in
racketeering and affording those injured by that activity in a
private civil action to recover treble damages.... The legis-
lative history . . .clearly demonstrates that . . . Congress
intended to provide new weapons for an assault upon or-
ganized crime and its economic roots; to seek eradication of
organized crime in the United States; to deal with criminals
whose access to an economic base constitutes a serious
threat to the economic well-being of the nation; to remove
the corrupting influence of organized crime from the chan-
nels of commerce; and to deprive organized crime of its
economic power by depriving it of its huge, illegal
profits.' 8
0
The court concluded that Fawaz had simply repeatedly cheated
on his income tax and, although the conduct could be "dis-
sected and shoe-horned" into a pattern, the court would not
allow such "hypertechnical parsing of a statute."' 8 '
177. For example, in Zahra, 639 F. Supp. at 1405, the court determined that the
defendants' repeated borrowing and investing of money over a seven year period
constituted only one scheme, i.e., "to borrow money from them without intending to
pay it back." Id. at 1409. See also Omega Constr., 667 F. Supp. at 463 (no pattern
because only a single "scheme or artifice" to defraud plaintiff); Cincinnati Gas, 656 F.
Supp. at 79-80 (pattern properly found since both fraudulent contract and fraudu-
lent concealment present); Evening News Ass'n, 642 F. Supp. at 861 (securities fraud
did not subject defendants to RICO liability because only one transaction).
178. 848 F.2d at 194, RICO Bus. Disp. Guide at 6936.
179. The state of Michigan had already obtained a state court conviction for the
taxes due and was receiving payment from the defendant pursuant to a state court
order. 848 F.2d at 194, RICO Bus. Disp. Guide at 6936.
180. Id., RICO Bus. Disp. Guide at 6936 (citing Russello v. United States, 464
U.S. 16, 26-28 (1983)).
181. Id. The Sixth Circuit applies a different standard in a criminal setting. In
United States v. Jennings, 842 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1988), the court held that the failure of
the government to prove that the defendant had actually participated in a second
phone call, so as to have committed two acts of wire fraud as opposed to one act,
resulted in a lack of a demonstrable pattern. Id. at 164. The government alleged that
two phone calls made during one evening, two hours apart, constituted a pattern. Id.
at 162. The Sixth Circuit analyzed the transcript of the second phone call and deter-
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Both the Second and Fourth Circuits seem to follow a crimi-
nal episodes test although both circuits would not so classify
their respective tests.'8 2 The Second Circuit, in an en banc re-
hearing of its decision in Beauford v. Helmsley,183 reviewed the
evolution of the pattern requirement in that circuit, calling the
decisions in the circuit "confused"'' 1 4 on the issue. The court
noted that, prior to Sedima, the case of United States v. Weis-
man 185 stood for the proposition that two predicate acts could
suffice to constitute a pattern. 8 6 After Sedima, in United States v.
Ianniello,18 7 the Second Circuit still followed Weisman but held
that the inquiry as to relationship and continuity could best be
addressed through the concept of enterprise.' 88 Because the
enterprise in Ianniello had the single purpose of a fraud of in-
definite duration, a RICO allegation was proper. 8 9
Following Ianniello the Second Circuit decided four addi-
tional pattern cases, rejecting RICO allegations in each be-
cause the enterprise had an obviously terminating goal which
mined that the defendant had not participated therein. Id. at 163. Because the gov-
ernment could not prove two acts of racketeering activity, the defendant's conviction
under that count was reversed. Id.
It seems clear that the Sixth Circuit would have affirmed the RICO conviction
had the transcript of the second telephone call indicated participation by the defend-
ant. This view of pattern cannot be reconciled with any of the criminal episode cases
decided by the district courts within the Sixth Circuit, nor can it be reconciled with
the Sixth Circuit's view in Fawaz. It is obvious that the Sixth Circuit is applying two
separate standards, one for civil RICO and one for criminal RICO. However, convic-
tion of a person for distributing drugs because of two telephone calls is not consis-
tent with the intent of Congress as expressed by the Sixth Circuit in Fawaz. There
was no discussion in Jennings of that defendant's racketeering background so as to
render his conviction a logical application of RICO. For example, there was no evi-
dence of a link between the defendant and organized crime or its economic power.
See Fawaz, 848 F.2d at 194, RICO Bus. Disp. Guide at 6936. While the court inJen-
nings did refer to the defendant's association with an outlaw motorcycle club involved
in criminal activity and noted that the association was an enterprise for RICO pur-
poses, the Sixth Circuit did not focus on the defendant's criminal activity with respect
to the club for the purpose of finding of a pattern. Jennings, 842 F.2d at 161.
182. See, e.g., Walk v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R., 847 F.2d 1100, 1105 (4th Cir.
1988) (interchangeable use of the words "scheme" and "episode"); Beck v. Manufac-
turers' Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 51 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 698
(1988) (two related acts suffice to constitute a pattern).
183. 843 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1988), reh'ggranted, Apr. 1, 1988.
184. Id. at 104.
185. 624 F.2d 1118, 1122 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980).
186. Beauford, 843 F.2d at 107.
187. 808 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3229 (1987).
188. 808 F.2d at 191.
189. Id. at 191-92.
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was short term.) 90 In Beauford,19 1 RICO claims were alleged
with respect to the conversion of an apartment complex into a
condominium. The plaintiffs were five tenants who claimed
fraud involving the offering of the units through the conver-
sion.' 92 The fraud related to structural defects, plumbing and
electrical defects, financing and maintenance costs.
193
The court affirmed the dismissal of these RICO claims be-
cause "a discrete, even if widespread, and a continuing, even if
finite, scheme" will not permit a plaintiff to take advantage of
RICO. 94 The court noted that regardless of whether the anal-
ysis is performed with respect to a pattern or an enterprise:
[W]e nonetheless require continuity in any event, and find
insufficient evidence of continuity in a single criminal episode regard-
less of how many fraudulent acts it entails. In other words, a single
criminal episode or scheme does not charge a claim under RICO be-
cause it lacks sufficient continuity to constitute an enterprise, even if
its fraudulent acts constitute a pattern. 195
The Fourth Circuit has likewise adopted a criminal episodes
analysis. In Walk v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R.,1 9 6 a group of mi-
nority shareholders brought an action challenging the pro-
posed merger of a railroad. The railroad allegedly transferred
its nonrail assets to an affiliate of the railroad's parent com-
pany. The plaintiffs were not in the class of shareholders with
ownership interest in the affiliate. 197 The transfer of the assets
allegedly occurred over six years.'
98
Next, the defendant's parent sold the defendant's interest in
190. See Creative Bath Prods., Inc. v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 837 F.2d
561, 564 (2d Cir. 1988) (three false representations in selling life insurance not a
RICO violation because acts carried out "in pursuit of a single short-lived goal");
Albany Ins. Co. v. Esses, 831 F.2d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 1987) (inducing insurer of defend-
ant's goods to pay false insurance claim not a RICO claim because plan had an "obvi-
ous terminating goal or date"); Furman v. Cirrito, 828 F.2d 898, 903 (2d Cir. 1987)
(partnership fraud not a RICO violation because the enterprise dissolved by fraudu-
lent sale of partnership); Beck v. Manufacturers' Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 51
(2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 698 (1988), reh'g denied, 108 S. Ct. 1588 (1988)
(sale at reduced price not a RICO violation because enterprise ceased functioning
after sale).
191. 843 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1988).
192. Id. at 104-05.
193. Id. at 105.
194. Id. at 110.
195. Id. (emphasis added).
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another railroad to the parent at a price allegedly below fair
market value. The parent then engineered a merger of that
railroad into the defendant and allegedly issued a fraudulent
proxy statement with respect to that transaction. The parent
also allegedly endeavored to depress the defendant's earnings
by shifting costs incurred by other subsidiaries to the defend-
ant. 99 Finally, the parent sought to rid itself of its minority
shareholders, the plaintiffs, by merging defendant into the par-
ent. This final merger was the subject of the action in Walk.
After reviewing its earlier pattern decisions,200 the court
turned to the facts in Walk. The plaintiffs alleged that the con-
duct at issue constituted at least four separate episodes or
schemes, each self-contained, and taking place over ten
years. 20' The court found that this activity did not constitute a
pattern because each episode "was merely another step toward
the accomplishment of a single, limited goal: getting rid of the
outside minority interests in [the company]."
02
The court went on to note that its holding did not preclude
the finding of a pattern in a single scheme:
Indeed, one of the most obvious examples of a RICO pat-
tern-a scheme that involves setting up a series of shell cor-
199. Id.
200. The court reviewed its pattern decisions, starting with International Data Bank
v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 154 (4th Cir. 1987). In that case the court had noted that
while a single scheme should not automatically preclude a finding of pattern:
[A] "single, limited scheme" designed to perpetrate a single fraud should
not be transformed into a RICO violation simply because the fraud's com-
mission required several acts of mail or wire fraud; such an interpretation
would, we thought, virtually read the pattern requirement out of the statute,
for it is "the unusual fraud that does not enlist the mails and wires in its
service at least twice."
847 F.2d at 1104 (citing Zepkin, 812 F.2d at 154-55). Thus, in Zepkin the court found
that multiple acts of securities fraud committed by issuing a misleading prospectus to
ten investors as part of a single stock offering did not constitute a pattern because all
the acts were designed to perpetrate a single fraud.
The Fourth Circuit then compared its Zepkin decision with a later decision, HMK
Corp. v. Walsey, 828 F.2d 1071 (4th Cir. 1987). In that case a developer had made a
series of misrepresentations to government officials in order to influence zoning de-
cisions regarding a certain tract of land. Unlike the securities fraud in Zepkin, the
conduct in HMK Corp. spanned four years and could be grouped into several distinct
episodes. Walk, 847 F.2d at 1104. However, the court found that the conduct was
really only a protracted zoning dispute and that the number of predicate acts and
length of time was simply a reflection of the peculiar context in which the dispute had
occurred. Id. (citing HMK Corp., 828 F.2d at 1074-76). Thus, the court found an
absence of a pattern.
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porations, selling stock in them by means of various false
representations, and then disappearing with the proceeds-
occurs in the corporate context. Such an open-ended scheme
contemplating the repeated infliction of independent economic injuries
on an indiscriminate number of victims may well pose a special threat
to social well-being.
20 3
The court said that its holding was limited to schemes "limited
in scope to the accomplishment of a single discrete objec-
tive." 20 4 However, even a scheme with a single objective
would constitute a pattern if the scheme contemplated ongo-
ing criminal activity of sufficient scope and persistence, such as
a series of bank robberies or embezzlements. 20 5
D. Other Approaches
The First, Third and Ninth Circuits do not follow a multiple
scheme or a criminal episodes approach. Instead, these cir-
cuits look at each allegation on a case-by-case basis. In Roeder
v. Alpha Industries, Inc. ,206 the First Circuit declined to adopt a
definition of pattern that relied "solely on whether activity can
be classified as a single scheme or episode." 20 7 The case in-
volved allegations that a corporation, its officers and board of
directors had obtained subcontracts through a bribe and had
failed to disclose that fact to the public. 20 8 The plaintiff subse-
quently purchased stock in the corporation, unaware of the
bribery. Later, after indictments and guilty pleas with respect
to the bribery, the value of plaintiff's stock diminished.
20 9
Plaintiff then brought suit, claiming that the activity consti-
tuted a securities fraud and mail fraud pattern under RICO.
The First Circuit commented that two racketeering acts do
not necessarily make a pattern and that the acts must be re-
lated and threaten to be more than an isolated occurrence.
210
The court found that all the acts, taken together, related only
to one instance of bribery. 21' The court then concluded that
203. Id. (emphasis added).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1106.
206. 814 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1987).
207. Id. at 31.
208. Id. at 23-24.
209. Id. at 24.
210. Id. at 30.
211. Id. at 31. The acts consisted of eleven phone calls, eight letters and the pay-
ment of the bribe in three installments.
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the alleged conduct did not constitute a pattern: "There is no
suggestion that defendants used similar means to obtain other
subcontracts, or that they bribed anyone else. RICO is 'not
aimed at the isolated offender.' "212 While the First Circuit
claims not to have adopted a multiple scheme or criminal epi-
sodes test, 213 this language is a paraphrase of the Eighth Cir-
cuit's multiple scheme test first set forth in Superior Oil.
The Third Circuit, in Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First
National State,214 held that an analysis of pattern rests on the
review of "a combination of specific factors such as the number
of unlawful acts, the length of time over which the acts were
committed, the similarity of the acts, the number of victims,
the number of perpetrators, and the character of the unlawful
activity."
21 5
In so ruling, the court rejected the multiple scheme analysis
of the Eighth Circuit2 16 and also rejected the view that a single
scheme constitutes a pattern only if it is potentially ongoing or
open-ended.2 1 7 The Third Circuit noted:
We do not believe, however, that the notion of continuity
compels a requirement of "open-endedness." At the very
least, such a requirement would produce anomalous results.
This approach would allow a party to maintain a RICO
claim if he brought suit before the unlawful scheme had at-
tained its objective; in such cases the scheme would presum-
ably be considered open-ended. This same interpretation,
212. Id. (quoting Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, 473 U.S. 476, 496 n.14 (1985)).
213. 814 F.2d at 31.
214. 832 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1987).
215. Id. at 39. In Barticheck, investors in an oil and gas drilling limited partnership
sued the two organizers of the venture and the bank which had loaned plaintiffs funds
for the failed investment. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had induced the
investment through several fraudulent misrepresentations constituting mail fraud.
The Third Circuit found a pattern in the Barticheck case based on the fact that the
alleged scheme was carried out by several individuals and two separate entities, in-
volving the repetition of similar misrepresentations to the twenty-three investors. Id.
216. Id. The court also rejected the multiple scheme analysis it had employed in
its past pattern decisions. See Town of Kearny v. Hudson Meadows Urban Renewal
Corp., 829 F.2d 1263 (3d Cir. 1987); Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co. of N. America,
824 F.2d 1349 (3d Cir. 1987); United States v. Grayson, 795 F.2d 278 (3d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 927 (1987); Malley-Duff & Assoc. v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 792
F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1986), aff'd on other grounds, 107 S. Ct. 2759 (1987). Each case was
decided based upon a multiple scheme test.
217. 832 F.2d at 39. This open-ended view has been the focus of the Tenth Cir-
cuit's repeated rejection of pattern claims. See, e.g., Torwest DBC, Inc., v. Dick, 810
F.2d 925, 929 (10th Cir. 1987).
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though, would deny a RICO cause of action in a case where
the scheme had fully accomplished its goal. Yet it is the
completed scheme that inflicts the greater harm and more
strongly implicates the remedial purposes of RICO.
2 18
A determination of continuity and, thus, pattern, according to
the court, depends on the circumstances of the particular
case.219 In two later cases, Saporito v. Combustion Engineering,
Inc. ,220 and Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc. ,22t the
Third Circuit found that patterns had been appropriately
alleged. 2
22
The leading case in the Ninth Circuit is Sun Savings and Loan
Association v. Dierdorff.223 In that case the Ninth Circuit found a
pattern based upon conduct consisting of four acts of mail
fraud by a bank president to the bank in order to conceal his
receipt of kickbacks from the bank's customers. The court
found that the commission of two or more predicate acts that
are not isolated events, are separate in time, and are in further-
ance of a single criminal scheme is enough to satisfy the pat-
tern requirement.2
24
The court held that the defendant's concealment of his kick-
back scheme constituted a pattern because it was not isolated
and continued over time, thus providing a threat of continuing
218. 832 F.2d at 39.
219. Id. at 40.
220. 843 F.2d 666 (3d Cir. 1988), petition for cert. filed, July 28, 1988.
221. 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988), petition for cert. filed, June 17, 1988.
222. In Saporito thirty-two former employees of the defendant alleged that the de-
fendant had fraudulently induced them to retire under a retirement plan while con-
cealing the availability of a more favorable plan. 843 F.2d at 667. The court again
followed the factors set forth in Barticheck, finding that the number of acts of fraud,
the number of victims and the similarity of the acts all indicated a pattern. Id.
In Environmental Tectonics, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants, companies
engaged in selling aircraft equipment, had bribed Nigerian government officials to
obtain the award of a Nigerian defense contract. The district court had dismissed the
RICO claims, holding that neither a multiple scheme nor a single, but open-ended
scheme had been alleged. 659 F. Supp. 1381 (D.NJ. 1987). The Third Circuit re-
versed, first noting that it had earlier rejected both the multiple scheme analysis and
the requirement that a scheme must be open-ended in order to constitute a pattern.
847 F.2d at 1063. The court found that the bribery was a "criminal activity that,
because of its organization, duration, and objectives pose[d] ... a threat of a series of
injuries over a significant period of time." Id. The court also considered as signifi-
cant the breadth of the conduct, noting that the pattern created an even larger class
of victims, the citizens of Nigeria. Id.
223. 825 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1987).
224. Id. at 193.
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activity. 225 The court contrasted this conduct with the facts of
an earlier case, Schreiber Distribution Co. v. Serm-Well Furniture
Co. ,226 in which the alleged pattern consisted of the diversion
of a single shipment of goods which, when complete, finished
the scheme. The Ninth Circuit also commented that the fact
that the scheme reaches fruition does not preclude the finding
of a pattern so long as a threat of continuing activity exists at
some point during the racketeering activity. 227 Subsequent
Ninth Circuit cases have refined this interpretation of the pat-
tern requirement.
22 8
In sum, there are three different approaches to pattern, each
with several variations. The most conservative approach is the
Eighth Circuit's multiple scheme approach. The most liberal
approaches are those of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits which
allows two predicate acts to constitute a pattern. Finally, a
middle approach is the criminal episodes analysis. A review of
the congressional history will reveal that the criminal episodes
analysis is the test most closely in keeping with the intent of the
original legislation.
VI. CONGRESSIONAL HISTORY
The Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary229 on
the Organized Crime Control Act of 1969230 sets forth the pur-
pose of Title IX (RICO)23 1 to be "the elimination of the infil-
tration of organized crime and racketeering into legitimate
organizations operating in interstate commerce." 23 2 The stat-
225. Id. at 194.
226. 806 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1986).
227. 825 F.2d at 194.
228. In United Energy Owners Committee, Inc. v. United States Energy Management, Inc,
837 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1988), the court held that a fraudulent inducement to a con-
tract with misrepresentations as to the progress of the performance thereof was a
pattern. The fact that there were multiple predicate acts against multiple victims was
relevant to the court's finding of a pattern. Id. at 360.
In Medallion Television Enterprises, Inc. v. SelecTV of California, Inc., 833 F.2d 1360
(9th Cir. 1987), the court held that fraud committed to induce a joint venture to sell
broadcast rights to a boxing match was too singular and isolated to be a pattern. Id.
at 1365. Similarly, inJarvis v. Regan, 833 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1987), the court found
that mail and wire fraud to obtain a special needs grant was "isolated and presented
no threat of continuing." Id. at 153.
229. See SENATE REP., supra note 39.
230. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970).
231. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68.
232. SENATE REP., supra note 39, at 76. See also McClellan, supra note 40, at 55.
"The product ... was a bill . . . to attack and to mitigate the effects of racketeer
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ute focuses on the activity of organized crime which had "infil-
trat[ed] legitimate organizations.' '233
The Senate Report discusses at length the "rising awareness
* of the depth of penetration of the forces of organized crime
into the fabric of our society and our commercial life." 234 This
penetration was viewed by the Report as "a major threat to the
proper functioning of the American economic system, which is
grounded in freedom of decision." 235 As of 1969, according to
the Report, organized crime already dominated the fields of
jukebox and vending machine distribution. 23 6 The Report
stated that businesses such as laundry services, liquor and beer
distribution, nightclubs, food wholesaling, record manufactur-
ing, the garment industry and other legitimate businesses had
been taken over by organized crime.
237
The Senate Report discussed other intrusions into legitimate
business by organized crime. In 1951 the Special Committee
to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce,
headed by Senator Estes Kefauver, found that organized crime
had also invaded a number of industries, including advertising,
appliances, baking, banking, basketball, boxing, construction,
football, hotels, radio, steel surplus and transportation. 238 In
addition, in 1959 and 1960, the Senate Select Committee on
Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field re-
ported that organized crime had moved into legitimate labor
infiltration of legitimate organizations affecting interstate commerce.... The Attor-
ney General in his testimony on [RICO] ... aptly observed that '[t]oo few Americans
appreciate the dimensions of the problem of organized crime; its impact on all
America, and what must be done to reduce-and ultimately to eradicate-its sinister
and erosive effects." Id. at 57-58.
233. Id. at 57. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981). "[Tihe major
purpose of Title IX is to address the infiltration of legitimate business by organized
crime." Id. at 591.
234. SENATE REP., supra note 39, at 76.
235. Id. (quoting REPORT OF ANTITRUST SECTION OF THE AMERICAN BAR AssOCIA-
TION ON S.2043 AND S.2049 (1968)).
236. SENATE REP., supra note 39, at 76.
237. Id. at 76-77.
238. S. REP. No. 307, Special Committee to Investigate Crime in Interstate Com-
merce, U.S. Senate, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. at 170 (1951). See generally SENATE REP.,
supra note 39, at 76. See also S. REP. No. 141, 82d Cong. 1st Sess. 33 (1951): "One of
the most perplexing problems in the field of organized crime is presented by the fact
that criminals and racketeers are using the profits of organized crime to buy up and
operate legitimate business enterprises." See generally ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra
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unions as well. 23 9
The focus of the legislation on organized crime is obvious
throughout the Senate Report. For example, in a discussion of
the definition of "racketeering activity," the report states that
the definition "include[s] those crimes most often associated
with organized crime, especially those associated with the infil-
tration of legitimate organizations." 240 As to the definition of
"pattern of racketeering activity," the report states:
The concept of "pattern" is essential to the operation of the
statute. One isolated "racketeering activity" was thought
insufficient to trigger the remedies provided under the pro-
posed chapter, largely because the net would be too large
and the remedies disproportionate to the gravity of the of-
fense. The infiltration of legitimate business normally re-
quires more than one "racketeering activity" and the threat
of continuing activity to be effective. It is this factor of con-
tinuity plus relationship which combines to produce a
pattern.2
41
In the report's discussion of the language of Section 1962,242
the report states that the section "establishes a threefold pro-
hibition aimed at the infiltration of legitimate organiza-
239. See generally SENATE REP., supra note 39, at 78, citing S. REP. No. 1417, Select
Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field, U.S. Senate,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); S. REP. No. 62, Select Committee on Improper Activi-
ties in the Labor or Management Field, U.S. Senate, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); S.
REP. No. 139, Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management
Field, U.S. Senate, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
240. SENATE REP., supra note 39, at 158.
241. Id. The comment that "the infiltration of legitimate business normally re-
quires more than one 'racketeering activity,' " when read in the context of the entire
Senate Report seems to refer to the infiltration of the business world, generically, as
opposed to the infiltration of a single business. See id., wherein the discussion focused
on the infiltration of types of businesses, i.e., boxing, construction, banks, labor un-
ions, etc. Clearly, the infiltration of one business, such as one hotel or one bowling
alley does not make somebody a racketeer or indicate probable affiliation with organ-
ized crime. Likewise, the fact that the person needs to commit numerous predicate
acts, such as fraud, extortion, or bribery, in order to accomplish the same infiltration
of one hotel or bowling alley, does not indicate such affiliation. Indeed, the contrary
is probably true. The necessity of repeated acts in order to infiltrate or takeover one
store shows either an inefficient or inexperienced criminal or a criminal with no repu-
tation to be taken seriously. Thus, it is most probable that the comment about infil-
tration requiring more than one act refers to infiltration of an industry, line of
business, or a segment thereof. Again, the focus should be on the character of the
alleged racketeer and an analysis of whether he or she has demonstrated the type of
repeated conduct which was the target of RICO.
242. 18 U.S.C. § 1962.
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tions."243 With respect to the civil remedies section, 244 the
report provides that the broad remedial provisions exist to
"reform [the] corrupted organizations ...and the only limit on
remedies is that they accomplish the aim set out of removing the
corrupting influence .... "245
It is therefore clear from the Senate Report that the target of
RICO was organized crime and racketeers and the goal of the
legislation was removal of those influences from legitimate
businesses and organizations. The report also sets forth the
rationale of focusing on the activities of organized crime. The
report refers to the infiltration of organized crime into legiti-
mate businesses as a "threat of the proper functioning on the
American economic system." The report stated that "[wihen
organized crime moves into a business, it customarily brings all
the techniques of violence and intimidation which it used in its
illegal businesses. The effect of competitive or monopoly
power attained this way is even more unwholesome than other
monopolies because its position does not rest on economic
superiority.'"246
The report illustrates some examples of the "techniques of
violence and intimidation- 24 7 to which it refers. Following
243. SENATE REP., supra note 39, at 159.
244. 18 U.S.C. § 1964.
245. SENATE REP., supra note 39, at 160 (emphasis added).
246. Id. at 76 (quoting REPORT OF ANTITRUST SECTION OF THE AMERICAN BAR As-
SOCIATION ON S. 2043 AND S. 2049 (1968)). See Wilson, supra note 106, at 42. "[Or-
ganized crime] is dedicated to illegality as a continuing enterprise, as opposed to the
accomplishment of a specific illegal venture." Id. (emphasis added). See also S. REP.
No. 307, supra note 238, at 170.
[Elvidence was produced before the committee concerning the use of un-
scrupulous and discriminatory business practices, extortion, bombing, and
other forms of violence to eliminate competitors and to compel customers
to take articles sold by the mobsters. Monopoly is the key to big money in
criminal activity. It is also sought by mobsters when they enter legitimate
business. A racketeer who has contempt for the law and who enters legiti-
mate business has no hesitation in engaging in black-market practices. This
gives him a considerable advantage over a more timid competitor and is one
of the means whereby the racketeer can push such a competitor to the wall.
Id.
247. Id. See also Blakey, supra note 7, at 271-72 (quoting 116 CONG. REC. 6708
(1970)).
A mafia boss accepts all the shares in ajuke box corporation in payment for
an illegal gambling debt. Then he expands the number of cafes in which his
machines are placed by having the cafe owners threatened and beaten.
Soon, he dominates the music machine business in his city, has ruined his
competitors, and raises the share of the machine income which he demands
that the cafes pay him.
Id. at 6709-10. See also McClellan, supra note 40, at 142: "In an eastern state the mob
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takeover of a business, the racketeer will use force and fear to
secure a monopoly in the service or product of that business.
When the campaign is successful, the organization begins to
extract a premium price from customers. At the same time,
purchases for that business are always made from specified al-
lied firms "[w]ith its extensive infiltration of legitimate busi-
ness, organized crime thus poses a new threat to the American
economic system. The proper functioning of a free economy
requires that economic decisions be made by persons free to
exercise their own judgement. Force or fear limits choice, ulti-
mately reduces quality, and increases prices." 248
In addition to violence and intimidation, business fraud is
another tool discussed in the report. Reference is made to the
takeover of a business by a racketeer who will then borrow
money for the business with no intention of repaying the
funds. Following the takeover the loans go into default, with
the racketeer enriching himself through bankruptcy fraud or
insurance fraud, possibly including arson. 249 These techniques
of organized crime, according to the Senate Report, effectively
eliminate competition,2 50 and are often aimed at the small or
marginal businessperson who is most vulnerable. 25'
Similarly, the report noted that the takeover of labor unions
can provide organized crime with the opportunity for theft
from union funds, extortion, and profit through manipulation
of welfare and pensions funds and insurance contracts.2 52 The
Senate Report states that trucking, construction, and water-
front entrepreneurs have been persuaded for labor peace to
"countenance gambling, loan sharking and pilferage." 253
While the focus of RICO was to "thwart the infiltration of
organized crime into legitimate business," 254 the question re-
burned several stores and killed employees of a large grocery chain-the venerable A
& P." Id. Senator Robert Byrd noted that arson had been used to put pressure on
the A & P to purchase mob-manufactured detergent. See 116 CONG. REC. 602-07
(1970); Blakey, supra note 7, at 271.




252. Id at 78.
253. Id.
254. See, e.g., ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 123-25. The Task Force
concluded:
Congress' overwhelming dominant purpose in enacting RICO was to thwart
the infiltration of organized crime into legitimate business. In an attempt to
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mained as to how to define who was a racketeer or a member
of organized crime.255 Will Wilson, the Assistant Attorney
General of the United States in charge of the Criminal Division
during RICO's deliberations, wrote that a difficulty with draft-
ing a statute for segregated application to "largely organized,
syndicated criminal activities" is the fact that organized crime
"has no precise legal configuration. ' ' 256 Similarly, Senator
John L. McClellan, the senator from Arkansas who sponsored
RICO, wrote, in response to criticism that RICO's provisions
were too broad in application, that "organized crime [is not] a
precise and operative legal concept, like murder, rape, or
robbery.'"257
During floor discussions of RICO prior to its enactment,
criticism was directed at the failure of the statute to define "or-
ganized crime. ' '2 58 Three congressmen, Mikva (Ill.), Conyers
(Mich.) and Ryan (N.Y.) wrote a dissenting view to the House
Judiciary Report, opposing adoption of Senate Bill 30, includ-
ing RICO. 259 One criticism was the fear that the treble dam-
ages provision would be used to harass innocent businessmen,
due to the need for a showing of only two acts of racketeering
activity: "A competitor need only raise the claim that his rival
has derived gains from two games of poker." 260 They also crit-
icized the lack of a definition of "organized crime.
'" 26 1
Similar criticisms were made by groups such as the Commit-
tee on Federal Legislation of the Association of the Bar of the
ensure the constitutionality of the statute, Congress did make the central
proscription of the statute the engaging in a "pattern of racketeering activ-
ity," rather than merely outlawing membership in the Mafia, La Cosa Nostra
or other organized crime syndicates. However, the required "enterprise"
concept, when coupled with the required "pattern of racketeering activity,"
was intended to keep the reach of RICO focused directly on traditional or-
ganized crime and comparable ongoing criminal activities carried out in a
structured, organized environment. The reach of the sltatute beyond tradi-
tional organized crime and comparable ongoing structured criminal enter-
prises was intended to be incidental and to exist only to the extent necessary
to maintain the constitutionality of a statute aimed primarily at organized
crime.
Id.
255. Id. See also Wilson, supra note 103, at 47-52.
256. Id. at 47.
257. McClellan, supra note 40, at 61.
258. See, e.g., ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 116-20.
259. Id. See also H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116-20 (1970).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 196.
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City of New York (City Bar) 26 2 and the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU). 261 In addition, the City Bar complained that
the list of offenses was too inclusive, containing offenses often
committed by persons not engaged in organized crime. 2 4 The
ACLU expressed concern that a person could be subjected to
the sanctions of RICO by committing two widely separated and
isolated predicate acts. 265 Attempts were even made to define
"organized crime." Representative Biaggi of New York of-
fered a floor amendment that would have defined organized
crime to include membership in the "Mafia," "La Cosa Nos-
tra," and similar criminal syndicates.
266
It is in recognition of these concerns that the concept of
"pattern" was developed. First, Assistant Attorney General
Wilson noted that:
Organized crime, by any of its names, is not, however, the
test for segregation, for, as noted above, those terms are
not sufficiently precise to serve as judicially manageable
standards. The differentiation is made on the basis of specific con-
duct, clearly spelled out in advance, and for which special treatment is
rationally justified.
Title IX [RICO] makes a similar determination of special con-
262. See ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE Crrv OF NEW YORK, THE PROPOSED OR-
GANIZED CRIME CONTROL AcT OF 1969 (S. 30) (1970).
263. See generally Letter from the American Civil Liberties Union to each member
of the Senate, Jan. 20, 1970, reprinted at 116 CONG. REC. § 422-26 (daily ed. Jan. 20,
1970).
264. See McClellan, supra note 39, at 142. The Senator's point-by-point analysis is
a worthwhile study for the purpose of understanding what this sponsor of RICO en-
visioned by the term "relationship." The New York City bar criticized the bill by
claiming that. the list of predicate offenses in Section 1961 is too inclusive and would,
therefore, unreasonably broaden the scope of potential RICO defendants. In re-
sponse to that criticism, Senator McClellan commented that the statute provided a
safeguard by requiring a pattern of such violations "[u]nless an individual not only
commits such a crime but engages in a pattern of such violations, and uses that pat-
tern to obtain or operate an interest in an interstate business he is not made subject
to proceedings under Title IX." Id. at 144.
265. Id.
266. See 116 CONG. REC. 35343 (1970):
"Mafia and La Cosa Nostra Organizations" mean nationally organized crim-
inal groups composed of persons of Italian ancestry forming an underworld
government ruled by a form of board of directors, who direct or conduct a
pattern of racketeering activity and control the operation of a criminal en-
terprise in furtherance of a monopolistic trade restraining criminal conspir-
acy .... It shall be unlawful for any person to be a member of a Mafia or a
La Cosa Nostra organization.
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duct deserving specialfederal prohibition. The prohibition here is
directed against the investment in legitimate business of
capital accumulated by a pattern of racketeering activity.
2 6 7
Senator McClellan responded to the complaints that the need
to prove only two acts would subject innocent businessmen to
the sanctions of RICO. He noted that "commission of two or
more acts of racketeering activity is made a necessary, but not a
sufficient, element of a pattern . ,,261 He stated that the term
pattern "itself requires the showing of a relationship... there-
fore, proof of two acts of racketeering activity, without more,
does not establish a pattern." 269 The Senator pointed out that
the target of RICO was not "sporadic activity."
270
As to the concept of "relationship" the Senator, in a discus-
sion about the pattern requirement of Title X, dealing with
sentencing guidelines for repeat offenders, compared the two
pattern requirements of Titles IX and X. Both the City Bar
and the ACLU had criticized the pattern requirement of Title
X, expressing concern that the severe sentencing provisions of
the title might be applied to a defendant who barely satisfies
the recidivist criteria of Title X.271 In response to this concern,
Senator McClellan stated that the pattern requirement of Title
X:
[C]overs continuing, repetitive, intermittent, sporadic, or
other conduct in which two or more similar or different
criminal acts bear relationships to one another which are
relevant to the purposes of sentencing, regardless of the na-
ture of the relationships. The variety of such relationships
precludes more detailed specification of them in the bill.
272
The Senator then noted that "[c]learly, just as in Title IX,
where the concept of "pattern" is employed, the intent of S.30
is clear, on its face and in the Senate Committee report, that the
term 'pattern' itself conveys the requirement of a relationship between
267. Wilson, supra note 103, at 50-51 (emphasis added). The concept of pattern
was also developed to insure the constitutionality of the statute. See ABA TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 8. "Congress made the central proscription of the statute the use
of a 'pattern of racketeering activities' in connection with an 'enterprise,' rather than
merely outlawing membership in the Mafia, La Cosa Nostra, or other organized crim-
inal syndicates." Id. at 71.
268. McClellan, supra note 40, at 144 (emphasis added).
269. Id.
270. Id. (quoting SENATE REP., supra note 39, at 158).
271. McClellan, supra note 40, at 150.
272. Id. at 154 (quoting SENATE REP., supra note 39, at 165).
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various criminal acts. "273 Thus it is clear that Senator McClellan
believed that the pattern requirement in both RICO and Title
X contemplated a relationship between predicate acts.
In response to criticism that RICO should not be extended
to mail, wire and securities fraud, Senator McClellan com-
mented that the listed offenses "lend themselves to organized
criminal exploitation, unlike some other offenses such as rape,
and experience has shown that they are commonly committed
by participants in organized crime." 274 He noted that "[i]t is
impossible to draw an effective statute which reaches most of
the commercial activities of organized crime, yet does not in-
clude offenses commonly committed by persons outside of or-
ganized crime as well." 275 The Senator cited as an example a
conviction of Salvatore "Bill" Bonanno, son of former Mafia
boss Joseph "Joe Bananas" Bonanno and a Cosa Nostra mem-
ber, for mail fraud and conspiracy for using a Diners Club
credit card extorted from a New York travel agent.
2 76
The inclusion in RICO of securities fraud likewise arose out
of a recognition by Congress that organized crime utilized
such conduct in its business affairs. 277 The Senate Report
noted that:
It is most disturbing... to learn that organized crime has
begun to penetrate securities firms and the Stock Exchange
itself. J. Edgar Hoover has testified: "We have over 30
pending cases [March 1, 1969] involving thefts of securities
from brokerage houses. Close associates and relatives of La
Cosa Nostra figures are known to be involved in at least 11
of these cases." Apparently, no area is immune.
278
273. McClellan, supra note 40, at 154 (emphasis added).
274. Id. at 143.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 143-44.
277. See generally ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 100-95. See also Glanz,
RICO and Securities Fraud: A Workable Limitation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1513 (1983).
The legislative record indicates that during 1969 Congress became aware of
a growing problem of theft and fraudulent resale of securities.... Attorney
General Mitchell described another problem in the securities area-stock
market manipulations resulting from huge purchases and sales of securities
by organized crime syndicates. By the time S.30 emerged from the subcom-
mittee in December, the subcommittee had become convinced that organ-
ized crime was heavily involved in securities thefts, and Title IX had been
amended to include securities fraud.
Id. at 1537-39 (footnotes omitted).
278. SENATE REP., supra note 39, at 22 (footnotes omitted).
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Senator Hruska, a co-sponsor of RICO, 2 79 testified in 1967
concerning the manner in which organized crime had infil-
trated an established brokerage house.280 A new man would
be placed in the brokerage house and would "almost overnight
. . . become a top producer and attract 'customers' with sub-
stantial funds available for investment." 28' Target companies
would then be selected and carefully controlled stock acquisi-
tion in that company would drive up the price of the affected
stock. False rumors would be circulated as to the potential
earnings of the company until the stock price soared. 282 Profits
would then be realized by the racketeers responsible, with the
company's management, stockholders and creditors "left hold-
ing the bag."
2 83
In summary, the congressional history of RICO consists of
far more than the few quotations found in footnote fourteen of
the Sedima 284 decision. Unfortunately, few courts have fol-
lowed the Supreme Court's lead, as expressed in that footnote,
and examined this history. This history reveals that the statute
was intended to eliminate organized crime and racketeers from
infiltrating legitimate business. 285 This same history reveals
that, due to the impossible task of identifying the racketeers
and the members of organized crime, the pattern requirement
279. See McClellan, supra note 40, at 57.
280. See ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 102 (quoting 113 CONG. REC.
17,998 (1967)).
281. ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 102.
282. Id.
283. Id. See also Glanz, supra note 277. "[W]e have every reason to believe that the
illicit traffic of negotiable securities is the latest and one of the most lucrative areas of
concentration for most organized mobs in this country." Id. at 1540 (citations omit-
ted). See generally ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 99 n.130. The Task
Force cites SEC concerns in 1969 that organized criminal syndicates were becoming
involved in manipulation of listed securities in major national securities exchanges.
284. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
285. See Blakey, supra note 7, at 276-77 n.119 (quoting 116 CONG. REC. 35, 204
(1970) (statement of Congressman Poff)).
Whether the technique of infiltration is intimidation and violence or simply
public purchase, the consequences of mob ownership of business concerns
are always evil. Business competitors suffer unfair competition. Workers
are victims of sweetheart labor contracts. And consumers are victims of in-
ferior products and services, price fixing and most of the predatory practices
of monopolies. Title IX mobilizes both the criminal and civil mechanisms of
the Sherman Act and other antitrust statutes against the barons of organized
crime.
Id. "Title IX is designed to inhibit the infiltration of legitimate business by organized
crime." 116 CONG. REC. at 196.
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was developed.2 86 Again, records of hearings and law review
articles written by key participants in the bill's evolution reveal
that the pattern requirement was the vehicle for identifying the
targets of RICO. 28 7 Assistant Attorney General Wilson wrote
that "the differentiation [between organized crime and the
mass of defendants] is made on the basis of specific conduct,
clearly spelled out in advance, and for which special treatment
isjustified."2 8 As Senator McClellan pointed out, it is the rep-
etition of racketeering acts, in a related pattern and over a pe-
riod of time which serves to distinguish the defendant as one
to whom RICO should apply 28 9
It is also clear from the congressional history that the inclu-
sion of mail, wire and securities fraud was not an idle, ill-con-
ceived act, but rather a recognition that these acts too are the
types of conduct employed by organized crime.29 When such
286. Id. at 204 (statement of Congressman Poff).
The gentleman inquired rhetorically as to why no effort was made to define
organized crime in this bill. It is true that there is no organized crime defini-
tion in many parts of the bill. This is, in part, because it is probably impossi-
ble precisely and definitively to define organized crime. But if it were
possible, I ask my friend, would he not be the first to object that in criminal
law we establish procedures which would be applicable only to a certain type
of defendant? Would he not be the first to object to such a system?
Id.
Cf. United States v. Carter, 493 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1974).
The fact that the alleged perpetrators are presumably respected and en-
trusted with responsibility... by stockholders does not suggest... that they
are incapable of engaging in organized criminal activity. We all stand equal
before the bar of criminal justice, and the wearing of a white collar, even
though it is starched, does not preclude the organized pursuit of unlawful
profit.
Id. at 708.
287. See, e.g., McClellan, supra note 40, at 55.
288. See Wilson, supra note 103, at 50. See also ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra
note 8, at 71-72. " 'Racketeering' was defined to embrace a potpourri of federal and
state criminal offenses deemed to be the type of criminal activities frequently en-
gaged in by mobsters, racketeers and other traditional members of 'organized
crime'." Id.
289. See McClellan, supra note 40, at 144, 154.
290. Senator Hruska introduced S.1623, the Criminal Activities Profits Act, in
March of 1969. This predecessor to RICO did not include mail, wire and securities
fraud as predicate acts. See Blakey, supra note 7, at 261 n.66. These acts were added
by December, 1969 when Senator McClellan reported Senate Bill 30 for the Senate
Judiciary Committee. Id. at 265 n.80.
According to Professor Blakey, the addition of these crimes as predicate acts
generated opposition from no less that Senator Philip Hart and Senator Edward Ken-
nedy, who filed individual views expressing the belief that the "reach of [the] .. . bill
... [went] beyond organized criminal activity." Id. at 268-70 (quoting SENATE REP.,
supra note 39, at 215). Professor Blakey also points out that these concerns were met
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acts constitute or are part of a pattern of racketeering activity
in connection with furthering or acquiring an interest in a
criminal or legitimate enterprise, then such acts can properly
serve as a basis for RICO liability.
291
VII. A PROPOSED PATrERN REQUIREMENT
Courts accepting Sedima's invitation to focus on RICO's pat-
tern requirement have attempted to reconcile the statutory
definition of pattern with the congressional history set forth in
footnote fourteen of the Sedima decision. The statutory defini-
tion simply requires "at least two acts of racketeering activ-
ity,"292 while the history referenced in footnote fourteen
discusses concepts such as "continuity plus relationship."
293
The inconsistency between the broad statutory definition of
pattern and the congressional focus on organized crime has
lead to inconsistent court interpretations throughout the coun-
try as to what constitutes a pattern of racketeering activity. Ac-
cordingly, a uniform approach to pattern is needed that is
head on during open debate on the bill. For example, treble damages were added to
Title IX after testimony that securities fraud did not belong in a racketeering statute.
Id. at 273 n. 112. Also, securities brokerage firms and accounting firms were also
subjects of the discussions. Id. at 254 n.48.
291. See ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 125. Conclusion four provides
in part that:
Congress did extend RICO's provisions to commercial and other fraud to
the extent such fraud is proscribed by federal mail, wire and securities fraud
concepts; but such commercial and other fraud triggers the RICO provi-
sions only when it constitutes or is part of a "pattern of racketeering activ-
ity" in connection with furthering or acquiring an interest in a legitimate or
criminal "enterprise." Nothing in the legislative history indicates that Con-
gress intended to provide an express civil treble damage cause of action for
any two instances of mail fraud or wire fraud, or to change the otherwise
established federal court precedent that there does not exist an implied pri-
vate damage cause of action for mail or wire fraud violations. Similarly,
nothing in the legislative history suggests that Congress intended to replace
existing express and implied private damage causes of action under the fed-
eral securities laws with the express RICO treble damage cause of action
whenever two instances of mail, wire or securities fraud occurred in connec-
tion with a securities transaction.
Id.
292. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(d). This section provides that:
"[Plattern of racketeering activity" requires at least two acts of racketeering
activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter [en-
acted October 15, 1970] and the last of which occurred within ten years
(excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act
of racketeering activity ....
Id.
293. 473 U.S. at 496 n.14.
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consistent with both the language of the statute and the con-
gressional history.
The application of RICO to "garden variety" fraud cases ex-
ceeds the congressional intent of the legislation. RICO was in-
tended to eliminate "the infiltration of organized crime and
racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in inter-
state commerce." 294 Clearly, then, some limitation on the ap-
plication of pattern is required. The broad language of the
statute must be limited functionally by the congressional his-
tory so that RICO's remedies will be imposed only on those
whom Congress intended to be the targets of the legislation.
A meaningful definition of pattern will apply to the repeat of-
fender while leaving the isolated offender to the operation of
other more traditional laws imposing civil or criminal liability.
Indeed, the Supreme Court's citation in footnote fourteen to
Title X's repeat offender pattern definition reflects the view
that more than a finding of criminality should be made before
a defendant can be said to be engaged in a "pattern" of racke-
teering activity.295
Since RICO is part of Title 18 of the Federal Criminal Code,
the term "act" of racketeering should be considered in the
traditional sense of mens rea.2 96 A repeat offender should have
made more than one criminal decision involving intent to en-
gage in independent criminal conduct before RICO is invoked.
Hence, there should be at least two separate acts of criminal
activity, as opposed to mere ministerial mailings or telephone
calls in order for a "pattern of racketeering activity" to be
found. While each mailing or use of the wires in furtherance of
294. SENATE REP., supra note 39, at 76.
295. Those courts which refuse to narrow the definition of pattern in light of the
legislative history and the direction of Sedima have relied upon the broad language of
the statute itself. As the Supreme Court noted in footnote fourteen of Sedima, how-
ever, the term "pattern" means more than merely two acts of racketeering activity.
473 U.S. at 496 n.14. "Indeed, in common parlance two of anything do not generally
form a pattern." Id. A pattern in common usage means "a combination of qualities,
acts, tendencies, etc., forming a consistent or characteristic arrangement." RANDOM
HoUsE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 1058 (unabr. ed. 1971).
296. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 415 n.1 1 (1980) (Congress enacted
criminal statutes against a background of Anglo-Saxon common law). "As such, no
reason exists, in focusing on the 'acts' that make up 'pattern,' to focus on a purely
jurisdictional 'act,' that is, a mailing, a use of a wire communication, or an interstate
or foreign transportation." RICO UPDATE, supra note 20, at 201. See also Lipin
Enter., Inc. v. Lee, 803 F.2d 322, 325 (7th Cir. 1986) (several mailings do not auto-
matically translate into a pattern).
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a criminal objective is a separate act, it is an act without in-
dependent significance unless accompanied by independent
criminal intent or independent harmful impact. Congress' in-
tent was clearly to focus upon true racketeers, those who re-
peatedly engaged in criminal conduct, as opposed to those
who engage only in an isolated case of civil fraud which can be
compensated by other provisions of federal or state law.
297
The multiple scheme approach first enunciated by the
Eighth Circuit in Superior Oil and later in Northwestern Bell is an
attempt to limit RICO to persons who have demonstrated a
propensity to use criminal acts as a way of conducting their
business. That test requires an analysis of whether the defend-
ant has "ever done these activities in the past [or] ...proof
that [the defendant was] engaged in other criminal activities
elsewhere."
298
The multiple scheme test correctly looks for evidence, of
continuity of activity by looking at past activities. The test cor-
rectly looks for evidence of relationship by looking at whether
the past activities were similar. However, the test is unsatisfac-
tory for several reasons. First, the test is simply too vague.
The Eighth Circuit has yet to expand upon this test by defining
what it means by a "scheme." 299 As a result, certain courts,
including the Tenth Circuit, in attempting to follow the Eighth
Circuit's approach, have viewed any conduct which is not en-
tirely open-ended to fall short of constituting a scheme.
300
This interpretation is an unreasonably restrictive view of the
concept of continuity. An application of this restrictive view
would protect racketeers who, through their activities, have
caused the termination of legitimate business enterprises,
through bankruptcy fraud, arson, mail fraud or other similar
conduct. Thus, racketeers who engage in the systematic liqui-
dation of legitimate businesses as a pattern of conduct would
be immune from RICO by their very success in fraudulently
milking the assets of the target businesses. This requirement
297. See, e.g., Northern Trust Bank/O'Hara v. Inryco, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 828, 835
n.12 (N.D. Il1. 1985) (issue characterized as whether the fraud was a "sport" or a
regular way for the defendant to do business).
298. Superior Oil, 785 F.2d at 257.
299. For Eighth Circuit cases applying a multiple scheme approach, see supra note
107 and accompanying text.
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thus produces an "anomalous result" since "it is the com-
pleted scheme that inflicts the greater harm and more strongly
implicates the remedial purposes of RICO.
'" 30 1
Second, because the word "scheme" has not been defined,
there are questions as to what type of criminal activity consti-
tutes a "scheme." The word "scheme" does not appear in the
statute. "Scheme" is commonly defined to mean "a plan, de-
sign, or program of action to be followed; project .. .an un-
derhand plot; intrigue." 30 2 Thus, a criminal plan or design
which contemplates income from an ongoing, repeated course
of conduct, i.e. through extortion, kidnapping, securities ma-
nipulation or bankruptcy fraud is, technically, only one
scheme. This is true even if the plan or design injures numer-
ous victims over a long period of time. Such a plan or design
certainly seems to constitute a pattern of racketeering activity
because the conduct involves repeated use of predicate acts
continuing over a period of time, and indicates that the perpe-
trator is the type of person who conducts his affairs as a racket-
eer. 30 3 However, because such a plan or design constitutes
only one broad scheme, no pattern would exist under a multi-
ple scheme approach.
A third problem with the Eighth Circuit's multiple scheme
test is the question of relationship. The test, as articulated in
Superior Oil, requires that the defendant has either committed
the same activities in the past or is engaged in "other criminal
activities elsewhere.' '304 The congressional history indicates
that there must be some relationship between the acts alleged
301. Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat. State, 832 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir.
1987).
302. RANDOM HousE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 1276 (unabr. ed.
1971).
303. Walk v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R., 847 F.2d 1100 (4th Cir. 1988). In Walk the
appellate court stated:
Nor do we mean to suggest that related predicate acts may always avoid
RICO liability by the "semantical game of generalizing the[ir] illegal objec-
tive." Quite plainly, a scheme that contemplates the repeated infliction of
independent economic injuries-e.g., a series of bank robberies or embez-
zlements-should not escape characterization as a pattern simply because
each criminal act shares the same general objective-the robbing of banks
or the embezzlement of funds. Schemes such as these, which involve the repeated
infliction of independent economic injuries-and thus the reaping of independent illegal
benefits-are precisely the sort of ongoing criminal activity to which Sedima's con-
tinuity requirement is addressed.
Id. at 1106 (emphasis added).
304. 785 F.2d 252, 257 (8th Cir. 1986).
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to be part of the pattern and the RICO claim being
presented.30 5 The first part of the Eighth Circuit's test, that
the defendant has committed the same activities elsewhere,
seems to respond to that congressional intent.
The second part of the test, however, is a departure from the
concept of relationship. The commission of "other criminal
activities elsewhere" will only occasionally be relevant to the
RICO claims presented in a proposed pattern. To allow evi-
dence of past or concurrent criminal activity bearing no rele-
vancy to the claims presented would be contrary to the intent
of Congress and the element of pattern. As discussed in this
article's section on congressional history, Senator McClellan
specifically addressed this point in response to extensive criti-
cism of the pattern element. That criticism stemmed from a
concern that hostile competitors of a legitimate business might
take advantage of the fact that the pattern definition required
only two racketeering acts. Thus, according to the critics, two
sporadic or isolated acts could be cited as a RICO pattern.
Senator McClellan responded by stating that a pattern requires
"a relationship between the various criminal acts." 30 6 To al-
low, as suggested by the Eighth Circuit, evidence of "other
criminal activity elsewhere" in determining whether multiple
schemes exist, would ignore the concept of relationship within
the pattern element.
Thus, while the Eighth Circuit's multiple scheme approach
has the virtue of singling out only the repeat offender, its pri-
mary defect is that it is too vague to be of much assistance in
conducting an analysis for pattern.30 7 The criminal episodes
305. See supra notes 229-91 and accompanying text.
306. McClellan, supra note 40, at 154.
307. See supra notes 103-32 and accompanying text. Under Section 1962(b) it is a
violation of RICO to acquire an interest in an enterprise through a pattern of racke-
teering activity. If a pattern is intended to distinguish the racketeer from the com-
mon citizen, and if RICO is intended to prevent the racketeer from gaining an
interest in legitimate business, neither purpose is served by finding that the single
takeover of one business is a RICO violation. The point of a multiple scheme analy-
sis is to focus on the perpetrator's history to determine if he has committed similar
acts. If the commission of those acts can play some role in the acquisition of the
interest in the legitimate enterprise, then there is a Section 1962(b) violation. An
example would be repeated episodes of securities manipulation and fraud involving
different victims and distinct objectives but all of which contribute to the ability to
gain an interest in the target enterprise. This can occur through the accumulation of
capital derived from the criminal episodes or through manipulation of the market.
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approach, first introduced in United States v. Moeller,30 8 also fo-
cuses on the repeat offender, the true racketeer, while at the
same time offering a more specific guideline as to what consti-
tutes a pattern. The criminal episodes analysis looks to the
question of whether repeated criminal conduct has occurred in
terms of repeated acts of crime, separate in time, having in-
dependent significance, and causing distinct injuries.
The criminal episodes approach eliminates from the purview
of RICO situations in which numerous predicate acts are
purely ministerial in nature in furtherance of a distinct criminal
purpose. Thus, one episode of fraud which is implemented by
numerous mailings or uses of the wire will not constitute a pat-
tern. Conversely, separate criminal decisions made at different
points of time causing distinct injuries are indicative of a pat-
tern. The criminal episodes approach focuses on whether dis-
tinct criminal decisions have been made within a stream of
predicate acts. For criminal acts to constitute separate epi-
sodes, they must be committed in furtherance of a separate
purpose, a purpose distinct from the goal of any similar crimi-
nal conduct of the perpetrator. Mere ministerial acts, such as
repeated mailings or use of the telephone, performed in the
furtherance of a distinct criminal purpose do not create a pat-
tern, even though such acts each may technically be a violation
of the mail or wire fraud statutes.
A distinct criminal episode has the distinguishing feature of
an independent harmful impact. This means that separate
criminal acts of independent intent and harmful significance
must exist in order for a court to find a pattern of racketeering
activity under this analysis. 09
The criminal episodes approach to the definition of pattern
is appropriate in view of the congressional history and intent
of RICO. A single fraudulent transaction, such as the fraudu-
lent certification of financial statements as part of an offering, a
single fraudulent sale of a security or some other investment,
or a single plan to churn a customer's account, are all only spo-
radic, isolated fraudulent acts which, by their nature, require
308. 402 F. Supp. 49 (D. Conn. 1975).
309. See, e.g., Techreations, Inc. v. National Safety Council, 650 F. Supp. 337,
339-40 (N.D. Il1. 1986) (episode distinguished from a pattern); Ghouth v. Conticom-
modity Serv., Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1325, 1337 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (pattern may exist even
where one victim injured as part of one overall scheme).
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repeated predicate acts for their implementation. This con-
duct does not establish that the perpetrator is the type of per-
son who regularly engages in criminal activity as a way of doing
business. Thus, this conduct falls short of being the pattern of
racketeering activity envisioned by the legislation. The fact
that this conduct may harm numerous victims or require nu-
merous predicate acts in order to implement the conduct is re-
ally only a function of the plan or scheme undertaken.310
The criminal episodes approach functionally eliminates
these types of activities from the purview of RICO because of
the lack of independent criminal decisions. The approach is,
however, appropriate for ensnaring the repeat offender who
regularly engages in such conduct and regularly causes in-
dependent injury to the victims of that conduct. By focusing
on the question of whether independent decisions to engage in
criminal conduct were made, and whether those decisions
caused independent harm, the criminal episodes approach
provides a functional analysis to identify appropriate RICO
defendants. 311
One way of determining whether independent criminal epi-
sodes exist within a series of predicate acts is to ascertain
whether independent and distinct injuries have occurred as a
result of the predicate acts. 312 If an independent and distinct
310. See, e.g., Sun Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1987):
This case [four acts of mail fraud in order to conceal a kickback scheme]
illustrates that extension through the continued federalization of states [sic]
common law remedies. Dierdorff's alleged kickback scheme simply
amounted to fraud until it began to be exposed, as it unraveled. Dierdorff
(in whose head, presumably, there were dancing visions of profits from his
alleged shabby scheme, rather than visions of the arcane nuances of RICO)
provided Sun with colorable grounds for RICO's civil treble damages by
sending four letters in which he sought to deny his wrongdoing to entities
other than Sun. Thus Dierdorff's predicate acts, arguably committed after
the fact and certainly not essential to the scheme, provide the bridge be-
tween common law fraud and RICO.
Id. at 197.
311. This approach is followed widely in the courts in the Southern District of
New York. See, e.g., Franklin & Joseph, Inc. v. Continental Health Ind., Inc., 664 F.
Supp. 719, 724 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("false advertising scheme only one episode imple-
mented by numerous . . . ministerial acts"); Savastano v. Thompson Medical Co.,
Inc., 640 F. Supp. 1081 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (single fraudulent effort implemented by
several fraudulent acts insufficient to meet pattern requirement); Soper v. Simmons
Int'l Ltd., 632 F. Supp. 244, 253-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (pattern requires multiple racke-
teering acts occurring in different criminal episodes).
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injury has occurred as a result of certain predicate acts, then a
criminal act of independent harmful significance has occurred.
The injury must be distinguishable from those injuries caused
by other of the predicate acts. Thus, in the case in which nu-
merous investors are harmed by a fraudulent certification of a
financial statement, the injures suffered by those investors are
not independent and distinct. All such injuries flow from the
one criminal episode reflected in the fraudulent certification.
If, however, the same perpetrator, in furtherance of some dif-
ferent objective, engages in some different criminal conduct
such as fraud with respect to the financial status of a different
client, those injured by that conduct would clearly have inju-
ries independent and distinct from those injured by the first
fraudulent certification. If such other conduct bears some rela-
tionship to the claims of the investors, then a finding of pattern
might be appropriate.313
Another aspect of the criminal episodes test is the distinc-
tion between ministerial acts in furtherance of a specific criminal
objective and acts in furtherance of separate and distinct criminal
objectives. Ministerial acts, such as numerous mailings or use
of the wire, occur in furtherance of an episode that has already
been undertaken. The acts are necessary to the implementa-
tion of the criminal objective. The acts do not cause any in-
dependent and distinct injury from those injuries
contemplated by that particular criminal objective. Such acts
have no independent harmful significance. Thus, if the crimi-
nal objective is to defraud certain investors through a prospec-
tus containing misrepresentations, all subsequent predicate
acts in furtherance of that objective are ministerial in nature.31 4
313. Compare H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 829 F.2d 648 (8th Cir.
1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1219 (1988). Northwestern Bell Telephone's illegally
influencing members of the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission by various meth-
ods including cash gifts, employment offers, tickets to sporting and cultural events,
airlines tickets, rather than constituting several incidents, were held to be a series of
related acts in furtherance of one overall objective: to influence rate consideration.
314. An example would be the churning of a customer securities account. The
decision to churn the account has only one objective-the receipt of ill-gotten in-
come through fraud. While an injury occurs each time the account is churned, the
injuries are exactly those contemplated by the original criminal objective. The inju-
ries, even though numerous, are the result of ministerial acts in furtherance of the
original objective. The acts thus have no independent harmful significance. Compare
Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297, 1304-05 (7th Cir. 1987), petition for cert.
filed Jan. 28, 1988 (pattern found because each injury from the same churning scheme
held to be separate), with Deviries v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 805 F.2d 326, 329
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The question arises in the case in which one victim is repeat-
edly injured by an ongoing scheme, such as a securities churn-
ing scheme or a scheme such as that which occurred in Appley v.
West.315 In Appley the beneficiary of a trust alleged that the
trustee had defrauded her of substantial assets by embezzling
trust funds. The Seventh Circuit found that a pattern existed
because each act of mail fraud caused a separate and distinct
injury to the plaintiff.31 6 In reality, however, the injuries to
that plaintiff were not separate and distinct when analyzed in
terms of the perpetrator's objective. The objective was to ob-
tain funds from the beneficiary through an abuse of the
trustee's fiduciary obligations. The fact that the relationship
allowed for repeated opportunities to carry out this objective
does not convert each opportunity into a separate and distinct
criminal decision by the perpetrator to engage in criminal con-
duct. That decision was made when the trustee elected to em-
bezzle from the plaintiff beneficiary. Each act of embezzlement
was only a ministerial effort to further the trustee's initial
objective.
The pattern requirement was intended to identify, by con-
duct, those to whom RICO ought to be applied.3 1 7 The crimi-
nal episodes approach complies with that intent by focusing on
the repeated acts of the perpetrator rather than the repeated
injury to the victim, as in Appley or in Liquid Air Corp. v. Rog-
ers,31 8 another Seventh Circuit case. The defendants in those
two cases did not demonstrate a true continuity of criminality
such as to identify them as the type of offenders that RICO was
intended to target. In both cases the defendants engaged in
the furtherance of only one criminal objective and caused only
one injury. The fact that the injury occurred segmentally does
not change the character of the injuries. The injuries were not
separate, independent and distinct from each other.
This potential pitfall can be avoided by requiring that, in ad-
dition to independent, distinct injuries, there also be distinct
victims. It is consistent with the congressional history and the
common meaning of pattern to require that more than one vic-
(8th Cir. 1986) (six-year churning scheme not a pattern because all in furtherance of
one fraudulent scheme).
315. 832 F.2d 1021 (7th Cir. 1987).
316. Id. at 1028.
317. See SENATE REP. supra note 39, at 158.
318. 834 F.2d 1297 (7th Cir. 1987).
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tim be harmed before a pattern can be found.31 9 The treble
damages provision of the statute exists to resolve a public
wrong: the infiltration of legitimate business by organized
crime. The existence of this special remedy supports the no-
tion that conduct which comes within the purview of this stat-
ute should be of the type which is harmful to more than an
isolated victim or a class of similarly harmed victims. Private
remedies already exist for resolution of "garden variety" inju-
ries to individual victims.
Further, the congressional intent to focus on organized
crime supports the proposition that a pattern of behavior is
that which is harmful to a variety of victims as distinguished
from that behavior which is isolated, sporadic and harmful to
only one or a group of victims. Just as it is difficult to see a
pattern of criminal activity resulting from one isolated act of
criminal behavior, it is likewise difficult to conceive of a pattern
of criminal activity directed at only one victim. In order to
bring the treble damages provision of RICO into play, a plain-
tiff should be required to show that not only he, but others,
have been independently injured by distinct criminal conduct.
RICO is intended to ensnare repeat offenders, those who are
engaged in organized crime and racketeering as a way of doing
business. The statute is not intended to reward those who
have been repeatedly injured. The focus must be on the per-
petrator and his conduct, not the severity or number of injuries
to his victim. The term "pattern" is a term chosen by Con-
gress to define the activity of those defendants who have en-
gaged in repeated activity which causes public injury, justifying
the imposition of treble damages and attorney's fees.
320
In addition to the existence of independent, distinct injuries
319. The criminal episode analysis as applied in the Northern District of Illinois
does not require, as a prerequisite, that the injuries occur to distinct victims. See
Ghouth v. Conticommodity Serv., Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1325, 1336 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
Nonetheless, the presence of more than one victim has strongly influenced the courts
in determining whether independent harmful significance exists and, hence, whether
criminal episodes exist. See, e.g., Papagiannis v. Pontikis, 108 F.R.D. 177, 179 (N.D.
Ill. 1985).
320. In other areas of the law, where a pattern is necessary in order to impose
liability, proof of a pattern is often showed by injury to others as a result of the
conduct of the defendant. See, e.g., Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985). In
Tuttle a single incident was sufficient to show a pattern of unconstitutional police
behavior when the behavior was so grossly negligent that it "spoke out positively on
the issue of lack of training." Id. at 814. Cf. Forstman v. Culp, 648 F. Supp. 1379
(M.D.N.C. 1986) (applying civil rights analogy).
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to distinct victims, conduct must also demonstrate continuity
or the threat thereof in order to constitute a pattern.3 2' The
element of continuity is necessary in order to establish that the
perpetrator conducts his affairs as a racketeer. Thus, an analy-
sis must be made of the perpetrator's conduct to determine if
he has demonstrated a propensity to use racketeering acts in
order to achieve his objectives. Absent this analysis, it is im-
possible to determine if the behavior in question is only spo-
radic or isolated. The congressional history, particularly the
Senate Report and written material authored by one of RICO's
sponsors, Senator McClellan, clearly establishes that sporadic
or isolated conduct is not the target of the legislation.
3 22
The Northern District of Illinois has required that criminal
episodes must be "somewhat separated in time and place" in
order for the episodes to be considered as being part of a pat-
tern.3 23 Requiring that the episodes be separated, at least in
time, comports with RICO's intent that only members of or-
ganized crime or racketeers be subject to RICO's provi-
sions.324 A criminal episodes approach which requires distinct
injuries to distinct victims by conduct separated in time and
place satisfies the continuity requirement intended by Con-
gress. A person or entity that conducts its affairs in this man-
ner poses a threat of continuing racketeering activity to the
public. It becomes irrelevant whether a particular "scheme" is
"open-ended" or "close-ended."
The concept of "relationship" which has been referenced in
footnote fourteen of Sedima is not at odds with the concept of
continuity. The term, which does not appear in the statute,
was used by Senator McClellan in response to concerns that
the pattern definition was too vague. The primary concern ex-
pressed was that a legitimate business, by committing two
predicate acts at different points in its operation, could be sub-
321. See supra notes 53-74 and accompanying text.
322. See SENATE REP., supra note 39, at 158. See also McClellan, supra note 40, at
144.
323. See, e.g., Techreations, Inc. v. National Safety Council, 650 F. Supp. 337, 340
(N.D. Il. 1986); Graham v. Slaughter, 624 F. Supp. 222, 225 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
324. This article has focused on a definition of "racketeer" which stressed an on-
going nature of the racketeering acts. Since it is impossible to determine with preci-
sion who is a member of organized crime, one must look at the manner in which the
perpetrator conducts himself to ascertain if application of RICO is appropriate. A
racketeer is the label which appears in the congressional history.
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jected to RICO. 325 Senator McClellan responded by referring
to the requirement of a pattern as a protection against such
application. The Senator compared the RICO pattern require-
ment to the pattern requirement of Title X, noting that con-
duct would constitute a pattern under Title X if "two or more
similar or different criminal acts bear relationships to one an-
other which is relevant to the purposes of sentencing." 326 He
stated that the Senate intended that both pattern requirements
convey "the requirement of a relationship between predicate
acts."
3 2 7
It is therefore appropriate to look to Title X's pattern re-
quirement for guidance as to when other criminal acts are suffi-
ciently related to be considered as part of a pattern. The
predicate acts which are alleged to be part of the pattern must
be somehow consistent with or relevant to the particular claim
presented. This comports with the standard definition of a
pattern: "A combustion of acts forming a consistent arrange-
ment." 328 This also comports with Title X's definition of pat-
tern: "[C]riminal conduct forms a pattern if it embraces
criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results,
participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise
are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not
isolated events."3 29 Thus, a separate criminal episode, before
it can be considered to be part of a pattern, must be analyzed
to determine if it is related to the episode which is the subject
of the RICO claim at issue. That analysis can be performed by
utilizing Title X's pattern definition.330
In summary, a review of the congressional history and the
case law interpreting pattern indicates that the multiple
scheme approach of the Eighth Circuit must be rejected.
3 '1
325. For the congressional history, see supra notes 229-91 and accompanying text.
326. Id.
327. McClellan, supra note 40, at 154.
328. See SENATE REP., supra note 39.
329. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e).
330. Accord Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14.
331. As noted, the primary problem with the multiple scheme test is that it is
vague and, thus, difficult to apply. While the Eighth Circuit's pattern test is labeled a
"multiple scheme" test, an analysis of several decisions from that circuit indicates, in
reality, that the circuit may be employing a criminal episode approach. The Eighth
Circuit's analysis closely parallels the criminal episode analysis in that the court
looked for related episodes of activity, committed at a different time, having separate
objectives and causing distinct injuries to distinct victims. Thus, the Eighth Circuit's
19891
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Similarly, none of the other circuits have developed a test for
pattern which successfully eliminates application of RICO to
garden variety fraud cases. The criminal episodes analysis un-
dertaken by certain district courts comes closest to reaching
the objective of limiting RICO to the types of perpetrators who
regularly commit predicate acts as a way of doing business.
The criminal episodes test can be improved by requiring that
distinct victims suffer distinct injuries as a result of different
episodes before a pattern can be found. This refinement will
aid the court in determining whether a particular defendant is
in fact a repeat offender properly subject to the enhanced pen-
alties of the RICO statute.
Accordingly, we propose that the following pattern require-
ment be employed:
A pattern of racketeering activity consists of:
(1) at least two racketeering acts,
(2) committed in at least two related episodes,
(3) with each episode being committed at a different time,
(4) with each episode having a separate objective, and
(5) with each episode causing a distinct injury to at least
one victim who is not the victim of a separate episode.
Episodes are related if they involve either similar or dif-
ferent racketeering acts that have the same or similar pur-
poses, results, participants, victims, or methods of
commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing
characteristics and are not isolated events.
RICO was intended to eliminate the infiltration of legitimate
business by organized crime. Because of the impossibility of
identifying with certainty the members of organized crime,
Congress created the pattern requirement. Congress deter-
mined that appropriate targets for the use of RICO would be
identified on the basis of a pattern of specific conduct, repre-
sented by the repeated use of racketeering acts.
3 3 2
The criminal episodes approach represents a functional
method for achieving these objectives while at the same time
avoiding the application of RICO to garden variety fraud. This
approach protects legitimate business from unreasonable ap-
plication of the statute while at the same time recognizing that
it is impossible to know whether a particular "legitimate" busi-
multiple scheme approach, as actually applied, may well be simply a criminal episode
approach. See supra notes 103-33 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 229-91 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 15
66
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 11
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol15/iss1/11
1989] RICO PATTERN REQUIREMENT 101
ness is covertly influenced or controlled by organized crime or
racketeers. The criminal episodes approach focuses on the
conduct of the business, requiring separate but related epi-
sodes of criminal conduct, committed over time, with distinct
injuries to distinct victims. As a result, a legitimate business
that engages only sporadically in the commission of racketeer-
ing acts will not be the subject of a RICO claim. The applica-
tion of the statute will be reserved for the habitual commercial
offender.
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